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The past several years have witnessed a significant increase in the
volume of state and local laws related to immigration, many of them
attempting to increase law enforcement efforts, and deny residency,
public benefits, and employment to undocumented immigrants.
Ostensibly erected for resource-guarding reasons, these sub-national
regulations act as legally constructed walls, closing off local
communities to migrants. Proponents of such measures also contend
that sub-national closure-especially in the shadow of lax national
border control-is critical to cultural stability and preservation. This
Article maintains that resource-guarding rationales are proxies for
culture-based exclusion. As such, this Article argues that
policymakers at national and sub-national levels should focus on the
viability of the cultural arguments underlying exclusionary legislation.
Such analysis will ultimately conclude that sub-national immigration
regulation is neither the only, nor most effective, method for
promoting community cohesion and stability. Because state and local
laws aimed at excluding immigrants cannot actually achieve their
purpose-i.e., preserving the cultural status quo-sub-national
entities should abandon their barrier-building. Community culture
will change and evolve regardless of the presence of undocumented
persons. In addition, constitutional constraints and economic
incentives limit the degree of closure any sub-national community
could hope to achieve. This Article then demonstrates that national or
sub-national units can create and maintain stable, culturally distinct
communities without building physical or legal walls. Indeed, the
current spectrum of local response to national border policy--with
some localities electing to embrace and include undocumented
immigrants-demonstrates that sub-national inclusiveness can also
serve community cohesiveness. A more generous immigration policy
will not de-stabilize sub-national communities, and therefore these
communities need not, and should not, exclude putative members,
regardless of citizenship status.
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"Hazelton is a small city, an All-American city .... Let me be
clear. This ordinance is intended to make Hazleton one of the most
difficult places in the U.S. for illegal immigrants.... We deal with
illegal immigration every single day. In Hazleton[, it] is not some
abstract debate about walls and amnesty, but it is a tangible, very
real problem. ,,
-Testimony of Louis Barletta, Mayor, City of Hazelton,
Pennsylvania, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, July 5, 2006.
INTRODUCTION
In response to the federal government's decision to build a fence
along a portion of the U.S.-Mexican border, the mayor of Eagle Pass,
Texas, one of the border towns along which the fence will run,
suggested that instead of a national fence, cities in middle-America
should erect their own barriers if they felt truly threatened by Mexican
immigration.2 Although impractical, his point was that the national
political community's decision to physically wall-off the border did not
reflect the sentiment of his local community. In fact, Mayor Chad
Foster's suggestion is a common opinion along the Texas-Mexico
border, in many towns directly and daily affected by undocumented
migration.3 In addition to believing a border wall is mostly symbolic, 4 an
inefficient use of public funds, and ineffectual,5 U.S. citizen-residents of
1. Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Examining the Need for a Guest Worker Program:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11-13 (2006) (statement of Hon. Louis
Barletta, Mayor, City of Hazelton, Pa.).
2. Fighting the Fence: Texans and Owls Take on the Federal Government, ECONOMIST, June
14, 2008, at 42, available at http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?storyI
d=11553857 ("'There's a misconception in mid-America that Mexico is overrunning the borders,' says
[Mayor Chad Foster]. He suggests that the rest of America fence their own communities if they feel
insecure.").
3. David Martin, Texas Mayors Oppose Plan for Border Fence, NPR.ORG, Oct. 16, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 15315131. Please note that throughout this article
I will refer to undocumented persons as neither "illegal" nor "aliens." The term "alien" carries pejorative
connotations that emphasize the strange foreignness of individuals who may have significant ties to the
communities in which they reside. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from
Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 303 (1977).
4. Douglas S. Massey, International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The
Role of the State, 25 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 303, 314 (1999) ("Faced with mounting public pressure
to control immigration ... politicians in many developed countries have turned increasingly to symbolic
policy instruments to create an appearance of control ... ").
5. WAYNE A. CORNELIUS ET AL., IMMIGRATION POL'Y CTR., CONTROLLING UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO: THE FAILURE OF "PREVENTION THROUGH DETERRENCE" AND THE NEED
FOR COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 2-5 (2008), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/images/File/misc/CCISbr
iefing061008.pdf.
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Texas border towns may feel differently than other members of the
national citizenry in part because they share ethnic, religious, and
linguistic backgrounds with Mexican migrants. For example, eighty-
percent of El Pasoans are of Hispanic descent, and most treat Juarez,
Mexico, located directly across the border, as a combined economic unit
with El Paso.
6
The demographics of most other U.S. localities differ significantly
from that of Eagle Pass and El Paso. Perhaps this is why over the past
several years many jurisdictions within the nation have followed
Foster's suggestion. Anticipating federal inaction and ultimately
frustrated by Congress's inability during its 2005-2006 sessions to create
new federal legislation governing immigration and border control,
7
several sub-national political communities took regulation of immigrants
into their own hands. Unable to build physical walls around their borders
like the federal government, cities like Hazelton, Pennsylvania erected
legal barriers to deter, exclude, and rid their communities of immigrants,
especially undocumented ones.8 This surge of sub-national legal wall-
building9  includes measures to penalize residential renting to
6. Living Together: El Paso, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2008, at 39, available at http://www.econo
mist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id= 1637349.
7. See, e.g., Sean D. Hamill, Altoona, With No Immigrant Problem, Decides to Solve It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A34, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/us/07altoona.html?sc
p=Il &sq=hazleton&st=nyt ("When places like Altoona pass such laws, it is a sign of growing
frustration with the federal government's lack of immigration enforcement, said Ira Mehlman,
spokesman for the Federation for American Immigration Reform."); Jon Hurdle, Judge Strikes Down
Town's Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20
07/07/26/us/26cnd-hazleton.htmlscp=2&sq=hazleton%/20ordinance&st-cse; Carl Hulse, Effort to Pass
Immigration Bill Collapses in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2
006/04/07/washington/07cnd-immig.html?scp=47&sq=immigration/20bill/20congress&st--cse; Adam
Nagourney, Carl Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, Bush's Immigration Plan Stalled as House G.O.P. Grew
Anxious, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/washingto
n/25bush.htmlscp=l &sq=Bush%/E2%/o80%/99s%/ 20Immigration%/ 20Plan%/20Stalled%/o20as %20House
20G.O.P.%2OGrew%20Anxious&st-cse.
The Hazleton City Council passed its Illegal Immigration Relief Act ordinance which
penalizes businesses for hiring undocumented workers and landlords for renting rooms to them in July
2006. Hurdle, supra. In response to the federal judge's rule that the ordinance was illegal, Hazleton's
mayor, Mr. Barletta stated that the fight was to "make Hazleton the toughest city in America for illegal
immigrants" and he "will not sit back because the federal government has refused to do its job." Id.
8. See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 5, 2007, at 32-33 (noting
that over the past 2 years, "more than 40 local and state governments have passed ordinances and
legislation aimed at making life miserable for illegal immigrants in the hope that they'll have no choice
but to return to their countries of origin," and that the individuals were elected to the Carpentersville, IL
board to help the city "do everything in its power to discourage illegal immigrants from settling there").
9. See, e.g., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, OVERVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION
RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION JANUARY-MARCH 2008, at 1 (2008), http://www.ncsl.or
g/print/immig/immigreportapril2008.pdf (noting that as of the end of 2007, state legislatures had
introduced over 1,169 pieces of legislation, tripling the number introduced in 2006).
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undocumented migrants, 10 deny public benefits and welfare assistance,11
empower local police to discover citizenship status, 12 restrict drivers'
licenses and government-issued identification, 13  deny or restrict
admission to publicly-funded higher education, 14 restrict employment
opportunities, 15 and deter the use of foreign languages.'
6
That border control and undocumented immigration 17 have spawned
significant backlash from the American citizenry is not surprising. The
national border has long been one of the most contested terrains in the
American political and legal landscape. 18 Throughout the nation's
history, when the U.S. economy has turned downward towards
recession, and financial distress has afflicted millions of Americans,
immigrants have been convenient scapegoats for the nation's ills. 9 Our
10. See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 8, 2006). See also Valley Park, Mo.,
Ordinance 1715 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark amende
dordinance.pdf, Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 (Dec. 26, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.or
g/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton thirdordinance.pdf; Farmers Branch, Tx., Ordinance 2892 (Jan. 2, 2007),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/farmersbranchordinance.pdf; H.B. 1804, 51st Leg.,
I st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007).
11. See, e.g., H.B. 1804, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007) (terminating, inter alia, public
assistance with exceptions for emergency care).
12. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN § 42-4-14, (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 171.2 (West 2008)
("When a person charged with a felony or with driving under the influence... is confined... a
reasonable effort shall be made to determine the citizenship status of the person so confined."); H.B.
2582, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/47leg/2r/bills/hb2
582h.htm (authorizing peace officers to "investigate, apprehend, detain or remove aliens").
13. See, e.g., H.B. 366, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2008) (prohibiting the issuance of a
driver's license to undocumented persons).
14. Mary Beth Marklein, Illegal Immigrants Face Threats of No College, USATODAY.COM, July
7, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2008-07-06-Illegaled N.htm ("In the past two years,
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia and Oklahoma have refused in-state tuition benefits to students who entered
the USA illegally with their parents but grew up and went to school in the state.... This summer, South
Carolina became the first state to bar undocumented students from all public colleges and universities.
North Carolina's community colleges in May ordered its 58 campuses to stop enrolling undocumented
students after the state attorney general said admitting them may violate federal law."); see, e.g., S.C.
Res. 1031, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/47leg/2r/bill
s/scr103 lh.pdf.
15. See, e.g., H.B. 2779, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (prohibiting the hiring of
undocumented workers and sanctioning employers for doing so).
16. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art III, § 6(b) (1986) (requiring English to be the "language of
instruction" in CA schools and constitutionality affirmed by Cal. Teachers Assoc. v. Davis, 64 F. Supp.
2d 945 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that the limitation of only "instruction" in English did not chill speech
or restrict liberty of students and teachers)); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-100 (West 2006).
17. Estimates put the number of undocumented immigrants in the country at 11 million as of
March 2005. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION 1 (2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf.
18. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
19. See generally ABRAHAM HOFFMAN, UNWANTED MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE GREAT
DEPRESSION: REPATRIATION PRESSURES, 1929-1939 (1974); Kitty Calavita, The New Politics of
Immigration: "'Balanced-Budget Conservatism" and the Symbolism of Proposition 187, 43 SOCIAL
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current historical moment is no different. What is significant now,
however, is the fact that the current reaction is pronounced at the sub-
national level, while the federal legislature remains deadlocked. A
measure of the significance of this shift is the recent proliferation of
legal academic literature on the subject.20
In comparison to the academic literature that examines the legality
and utility of sub-national immigration regulations, 2' this Article
analyzes culture-based reasons for these state and local reactions. It
applies the insights of cultural theorists to the sub-national phenomena
detailed by immigration-federalism scholars. As the Texas border-town
response suggests, citizens in other sub-national jurisdictions attempting
to exclude undocumented migrants may be trying to protect something
more than their economic fortunes when they erect legal barriers to shut
out newcomers. Specifically, sub-national political communities, as part
of their process of self-definition, attempt to exclude outsiders to
preserve their culture, including their racial, religious, and linguistic
hegemony, and their shared heritage. 22 They attempt this preservation
because cultural homogeneity helps ensure community cohesiveness,
which in turn promotes political and social stability for that political
unit. Proponents of national and sub-national closure believe that
increased immigration, especially undocumented immigration and
immigration primarily from one country will erode the current culture of
their communities, eventually leading to disconnectedness and
instability.
This Article critiques the notion that, in response to increased
immigration or lax border control, sub-national entities must close
themselves off to maintain their cultural cohesiveness and stability. Built
into this theory of federal/sub-federal causality are three implicit
PROBLEMS 284, 284-85 (1996).
20. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously,
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57.
21. See Huntington, supra note 20 (examining the constitutionality of sub-federal legislation);
Rodriguez, supra note 20 (arguing that localities play an important role in integrating immigrants, and
therefore should be afforded latitude to legislate); Schuck, supra note 20 (arguing that allowing sub-
national entities to regulate immigration has not led to an anticipated race to the bottom).
22. Stephen R. Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 94, 110-25
(Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY 38-40 (1983).
Indeed, early national immigration policy was expressly based on the notion of preserving
cultural homogeneity by excluding non-Anglo, non-Protestant, and non-English-speaking foreigners.
Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural Nation: The Challenge of
Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1383-85 (2005).
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assumptions that this Article refutes. First, the theory presumes that
closure will preserve a community's culture. Second, it presupposes that
closure is practically and substantially attainable by a sub-national
community. And, third, it assumes that legal wall-building will be the
only response by sub-national communities to increased immigration
that may threaten the cultural status quo. This Article does not dispute
that national immigration policy foments sub-national responses. Nor
does it contest the idea that political communities strive for stability
through cultural connectedness. However, this article argues that cultural
cohesion need not be pursued through closure. Examining those
communities that have responded to current immigration levels through
closure, I argue that exclusion of undocumented immigrants will not
maintain their cultural status quo. In addition, the communities'
potential for culture-based closure is significantly constrained by
constitutional prohibitions and economic realities. Indeed, considering
the current spectrum of sub-federal responses to the presence of
undocumented immigrants, states and localities also define themselves
and respond to increased immigration through inclusion. Importantly, an
inclusive response is not antithetical to the pursuit of cultural cohesion
and stability.
The critical contribution this Article makes to immigration and
constitutional scholarship is its challenge to the legislative rationale that
sub-national legal closure is both necessary and conducive to the
stability of political communities. Existing bi-directionality in state and
local legislative reactions to current levels of documented and
undocumented immigration serve as evidence of a more nuanced set of
sub-national responses to migration-induced cultural change. Compared
to the inability and impracticality of closure as a path to preserving
contemporary iterations of culture, inclusive jurisdictions seek cohesion
either because of, or despite, their welcoming of newcomers into their
community. Based on this analysis, this Article promotes the following
legislative and doctrinal reorientations: (1) Political communities at any
level should abandon cultural preservation as a public policy goal; (2)
Courts must restrict use of the plenary power doctrine because of the
imbalances it creates between overlapping membership communities at
the national and sub-national levels; and (3) Sub-national entities are
encouraged to employ inclusionary public policies to serve the
cohesiveness and stability of their institutions and communities. In
addition, this Article advances the growing body of academic literature
questioning the wisdom and legality of limiting immigration and
1447
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increasing border enforcement.23
Part I explains the importance of preserving cultural bondedness,
explaining the connection between it, exclusionary legislation, and well-
functioning, stable communities. Having established the significance of
cultural cohesion to a political community's survival, Part II explores
the limitations of sub-national legal wall-building. The first constraint
focuses on what closure can potentially accomplish. Here, the Article
debunks the erroneous belief that the barring of outsiders can preserve
particular iterations of culture. The second set of constraints is
prohibitions on the methods of closure. Unable to exclude on the basis
of prominent cultural markers such as race, religion, and language, sub-
national entities turn to economic deterrents that only crudely, if at all,
serve the goal of cultural cohesion. Given the limited effectiveness of
legally constructed barriers, Part III investigates the alternative ways for
communities to achieve connectedness and stability. Most importantly,
this Article argues that the decision by some states and localities to
accommodate, and even welcome, undocumented persons into their fold
demonstrates that closure is neither an inevitable response to lax border
control, nor the only path to self-definition, cultural cohesion, and
community stability. In short, neither wire fences nor legal walls are
critical to national or sub-national well-being.
I. SUB-NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL
COHESION
Before critiquing sub-national closure, Part I.A explains the linkage
between national border policy and sub-national reaction. In addition,
Part I.B will establish the reason why political communities, at any
level, choose to exclude outsiders. Assessing a few theories regarding
the necessity of exclusion to a political community, this Article settles
on justifications for closure that relate to the role cultural cohesion may
play in allowing for well-functioning political and social institutions.
Having established the connection between exclusion, cultural
commonality, and stable institutions in this section, Part II will then
critically evaluate the limitations of using legal closure as the means to
cultural preservation.
23. See generally Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 65;
Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2004); Kevin R. Johnson, Protecting
National Security Through More Liberal Admission of Immigrants, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 157; Perry,
supra note 22, at 110-25.
1448
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A. The Relationship Between National Border Control and Sub-national
Immigration Regulation
The notion of a feedback loop between national border laxity and sub-
national closure was most famously articulated by the political
philosopher Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice. Walzer's key insight
justifying a political community's control 24 over its national border and
the exclusion of outsiders is the causal relationship between national
border control and sub-national reaction. Walzer provides an
instrumental justification for a highly regulated national border under
complete sovereign control. In his analysis, a political community's
strict control over its national borders is critical because such exclusion
serves the goal of greater domestic inclusion. 25 Spared from the threat of
uncontrolled migration and the concomitant changes it brings, local
communities will continue to be distinct, cohesive, and stable. In sum,
when assured of a regulated territorial border at the federal level, sub-
national entities-states, counties, localities, neighborhoods-are less
likely to close themselves off, and more likely to allow free access,
movement, and membership.
The hypothesized causal connection between federal and sub-federal
units permits us to understand sovereign border control as sound policy
rather than pre-ordained power. In contrast, the Supreme Court's early
understanding of the national exclusion power rested on fiat instead of
reason. 26 The Chinese Exclusion cases opined that unfettered control of
immigration decisions was inherent in the very notion of sovereignty
and needed no independent constitutional justification.27 However, in
our current era of globalization, with free and rapid trans-national
movement of goods, services, and capital,28 and in an era of thinning
24. WALZER, supra note 22, at 39 (stating that a "sovereign state must take shape and claim the
authority to make its own admissions policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants,"
but also proscribing majoritarian decisions on immoral basis, and requiring sovereignties to aid
necessitous strangers).
25. Id. at 39.
26. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States
(The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) ("The power of exclusion of foreigners being
an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign
powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any
one.").
27. See supra note 26.
28. Richard T. Ford, City-States and Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 209, 210-11 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds.,
2001); Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an
Analysis of US. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 22, at 158, 158-68.
1449
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sovereignty, 29 when state actions are not beyond the reproach of
international law,30  the Supreme Court's thick notion of national
sovereign power is anachronistic.
31
In contrast, Walzer's theory justifies border control based on the
value of "distinctiveness" to a political community. 32 Although Walzer
does not define distinctiveness, the logical elucidation of his meaning
suggests that he conceptualizes a cohesive community culture that binds
incumbent members and has traits and features that are identifiable and
particular. 33 Therefore, throughout this article, the good that political
communities seek through legal-wall building is referred to as cultural
cohesion.
Sub-national regulation intended to exclude undocumented migrants,
then, responds to the perception that lax border control will degrade the
cultural ties among incumbent community members. Conversely,
however, if neighborhoods and localities are unable to secure
meaningful connectedness, either because constitutional principles
forbid the means used to achieve desired levels of cultural homogeneity
or because preservation of a cultural status quo is itself an unattainable
end, then the openness of national borders is only marginally relevant to
sub-national reaction. In addition, if closure and exclusion are
29. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 59-99
(1996); Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in the Information Age, 37 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 68-70 (2004).
30. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights Law Can
Reform Our Immigration System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 324-44 (2008); see also LINDA
BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 25 (2006)
("While nation-states continue to define the nature and scope of most rights, as well as to enforce them,
states can no longer be said to be the sole source of existing positive rights. As is well known, the
international human rights regimes that developed in the post-World War II period were designed to
implement supranational standards for the treatment of individuals by states.").
31. Seyla Benhabib, Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World, in
POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 404, 406-07 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner
eds., 2002) ("[T]he state-centric system of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-is, if not at an
end, at a minimum undergoing a deep reconfiguration."). More recent Supreme Court decisions still rely
on conceptions of sovereign power first articulated over 130 years ago, prior to the advent of electronic
communication, international institutions, rapid travel, and trans-national human rights norms. See, e.g.,
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
32. WALZER, supra note 22, at 39 ("The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon
closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a
value, as most people (though some of them are global pluralists, and others only local loyalists) seem to
believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere. At some level of political organization, something
like the sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions policy, to
control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants.").
33. Id. at 62 ("Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest
the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be communities of character,
historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one
another and some special sense of their common life." (emphasis omitted)).
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unnecessary for cultural cohesiveness and political stability, sub-national
communities should refrain from enacting restrictive immigration
regulation in the name of cultural preservation.
Part I.B discusses the first of these questions-whether cultural
cohesion is a public good worth achieving. Part II takes up analysis of
the remaining questions regarding the potential for closure to achieve
cohesion and stability.
B. The Importance of Cultural Cohesion and Continuity
Assuming that national border policy may foment sub-national
closure, to justify exclusion of newcomers from a local political
community, there must be some account of what current members are
trying to accomplish through that exclusion. One such focus is the
relationship between exclusion and community stability. A political
community will exclude putative members to maintain the cultural status
quo, which for incumbent members is presumably identifiable and
distinctive. The persistence of the incumbent, dominant culture, in turn,
provides the commonality and bondedness necessary to stabilize
political and social institutions. 34 In short, because sub-national political
communities strive for stability and survival, they legislate to preserve
the bonds that ensure that stability and survival.
One method of preserving the current bondedness and commonality
of a community is to erect legal walls to exclude putative members,
especially undocumented immigrants, who may not share the dominant
cultural traits of the incumbent residents. Those outsiders may introduce
new practices, social customs, racial and religious backgrounds, and
languages that endanger the cohesiveness of the existing political
community. Depending on the justification proffered, however, sub-
national legislation may or may not be defensible. I discuss below three
potential justifications for laws that bar outsiders, settling on the
justification that defends exclusion only at the hypothetical moment
when immigration threatens the very existence of the political
community itself. Ultimately, I adopt Professor Stephen Perry's
conception of justice in immigration law, and take the position that the
U.S. is not nearly at the point when closed borders and limited
34. Perry, supra note 22, at 113-14 ("a certain degree of cultural stability and cohesiveness is
necessary to preserve either general social and political stability or the liberal/democratic character of
existing political institutions"); see also Johnson & Hing, supra note 22, at 1390 ("We recognize that
even a multicultural society must share a core of values in order to provide a means to live together as a
society. Without a commitment to a common core, balkanization into assorted factions is likely and
eliminating interethnic violence and tension will prove more difficult.").
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immigration are necessary. 35 Nevertheless, this analysis demonstrates
that sub-national exclusion can potentially be justified by its relationship
to community stability. Later sections will then wrestle with the question
whether exclusion is the best, or only, regulatory path to commanity
stability and survival.
The first untenable justification for exclusion of outsiders relies on a
version of American culture tied to a particular vision of the nation's
ethnic, religious, and linguistic roots. Convincing skeptics to ratify the
Constitution, John Jay's vision of the emerging constitutional order
explicitly endorsed the virtues of a specific type of cultural
homogeneity:
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that Providence has been
pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people, a people
descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of
government, very similar in their manners and customs ....
Inaccurate as it was even in the late 1700's, decades of forced migration
of slaves, imperial conquest, and steady immigration have certainly
complicated Jay's vision of cohesion through ancestral, linguistic, and
religious homogeneity.
37
Despite these intervening demographic shifts, some contemporary
scholars still advocate a return to the cohesiveness created by the shared
ethnic and religious backgrounds of a bygone era.38 Importantly, this
justification for border closure does little to distinguish between
documented and undocumented persons, as it focuses not on formal
legal status, but immutable and deeply held characteristics of putative
members. At base, closure based on a specific ethno-cultural dominance
or homogeneity amounts to the claim that the state's role is to protect the
majority's culture. 39 This claim, however, is anathema to the purpose of
35. See Perry, supra note 22, at 114.
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 32 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
37. 1 am not defending a static understanding of culture that limits cultural definition to these
identities. I discuss them throughout the Article because they map current political and legal
understandings of the constituent parts of culture. Under any definition of culture, however, it is likely
true that these identities significantly inform the ways in which individuals comprehend and interact
with the world. Cf Samuel Scheffler, Immigration and the Significance of Culture, 35 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 93 (2007).
38. See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO
AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004); see also Lauren Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration
Policy in the U.S. and the European Union, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 99, 133 (2008) (identifying, without
endorsing, scholars who take this view).
39. Perry, supra note 22, at I11.
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1452 2008-2009
2009] SUB-NATIONAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION
establishing liberal democracies such as the United States. 4' State-
enforced cultural protection requires extensive governmental
involvement in decisions affecting deeply-held social, sexual, moral, and
religious matters, and is the hallmark of autocratic or theocratic
regimes.4 1 While many federal and sub-federal policies in the U.S. may
seek to advance hegemonic views of cultural majorities, it is difficult to
make the case that the very purpose of governmental entities is to protect
these cultural expressions. The Constitution identifies its own purpose in
culturally non-specific terms: "to form a more perfect Union, establish
justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity." 42 Combined with its prohibitions on
religious establishments, 43 and its creation of a counter-majoritarian
judiciary, 44 any governmental protection of the dominant culture may be
a by-product of a liberal democratic system, but not its goal.
In comparison, a justification for closure based on the value of the
collective act of excluding is less prejudicial, but ultimately indefensible
as well. Legal scholars like Frederick Schauer posit that political
communities can and should exclude because of the good feelings that
exclusion produces for the "in" group. 45 Under this perspective, the very
act of jointly excluding outsiders forms the basis for commonality and
connectedness within the incumbent community. That is, the exclusion
is not necessary to serve another purpose other than to act as the bonding
agent for those voting for closure. This perspective, however, provides
scant justification for public policy when measured against the disutility
of exclusion to outsiders.
46
Any position that celebrates the act of collective exclusion itself as its
goal is unpersuasive as a reason to allow sub-national entities to limit
membership and residency to incumbents. First, as Professor Aleinikoff
argues, the good feelings generated for the community by exclusion are
40. Cf Angel R. Oquendo, National Culture in Post-National Societies, 50 VILL. L. REV. 963, at
972-73 (2005).
41. See, e.g., SAUDI ARABIA CONST. arts. 9, 13, 34.
42. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137 (1803) (declaring an act of Congress void); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998).
45. Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 1504, 1517 (1986) ("In preferring some, we of course do not prefer others, and it is in a way sad
and in a way paradoxical that we hold ourselves together by fencing others out. But that it is sad and
paradoxical does not make the phenomenon less real.").
46. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 9 (1990).
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thin justification for exclusion. 47 Compared to the gravity of economic,
social, and political claims of outsiders seeking admission, positive
feelings alone cannot validate complete denial.48 Second, Schauer's
position has no apparent starting or stopping point. Logically, so long as
outsiders exist, collective exclusion can perform its function of bonding
the polity and generating good feelings. In other words, hordes of
undocumented persons could enter the country and then participate in
the collective exclusion of other outsiders. Standing alone, exclusion for
exclusion's sake does not distinguish between the presence of
undocumented and documented immigrants.
Also, collective exclusion in and of itself does not provide an
explanation as to how or why the political community will be better
served, better stabilized, or better equipped for long-term survival. The
shared exclusionary impulse is temporary glue for a political
community. While good feeling generated by collective exclusion may
provide an immediate injection of faith and pride in shared institutions,
over time, the fragility of the bond will not serve to facilitate agreement
on internal distributional concerns or other public policy goals. In short,
as a moral, logical, and instrumental matter, theories of collective
exclusion for no other reason than to harvest the feelings generated by
that collective act, do not sufficiently explain why political communities
desire to limit membership.
In contrast to either exclusion to protect a specific demographic
character or exclusion for its own sake, Professor Perry presents a more
defensible justification for restricting entry into political communities. 49
By rejecting outsiders, especially outsiders who do not share the
dominant culture of the incumbent majority of citizens, the current
polity stands a greater chance of preserving those traits, practices, and
traditions that have thus far bonded them together. This connection
formed by shared identity characteristics, practices, and mores is a thick
binding agent, ensuring the community will have some common
foundation to inform their lives together as a political entity. Perry
elucidates that a community's claim to use state coercion to exclude
outsiders is triggered only when the addition of immigrants will so
drastically change the incumbent community's culture as to cause
47. Id. at 28.
48. See Ayelet Shachar, The Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 367, 370 (2007) (arguing that opportunities and rights flowing from national citizenship
gained through birth are like "inherited property" and that citizens in wealthy countries have an
obligation to those born in other states).
49. Perry, supra note 22, at 104.
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instability in the institutions of everyday life and governance. 50 As he
notes, this moment when new members-whether documented or
undocumented-will jeopardize the existence of the community itself is
too distant to justify current movements to close national and sub-
national borders.5 1 However, because it provides a legitimate basis for
the current spate of sub-national legislative reactions, this Article
presumes that sub-national communities exclude because they perceive
immigrants as threats to their incumbent culture, and by extension, to the
stability of their political and social institutions.
This justification, based on the stability and survival of the political
community's institutions, provides plausible explanations for a sub-
national entity's compulsion to exclude undocumented migrants.
Institutional stability and promotion of autonomy are critical to the
functioning of the U.S. democracy or that of any liberal democratic
state, and are stated goals of the Constitution itself.5 2 Moreover, the
causal link for this explanation is lucid. A political community-at
either the national level, or at the sub-national level-in response to an
influx of immigrants who do not share the dominant culture of the
majority of the community, will seek to exclude and limit those
immigrants so that their dominant culture will not be threatened or
changed. A stable dominant culture provides a deep bond between the
community members, contributing to the ability of their governing
institutions to continue functioning effectively. 53 In short, it helps insure
domestic tranquility.
Accepting that institutional stability sufficiently explains the
importance of cultural cohesion and preservation to a political
community, Part II probes constraints on the pursuit of that cohesion
through closure.
50. Of note, and for the sake of completeness, Perry also presents another plausible justification
for exclusion based on a shared culture's ability to promote individual autonomy by providing structure
and context for individual flourishing. Id. at 115-17. In this conception, the state's exclusionary power
should be used to facilitate the autonomy and expressive needs of incumbent members. See also WILL
KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 163-66 (1989). This justification could also find
support within our constitutional order. U.S. CONST. amend. I. However, it does not merit further
discussion here because each individual will have varying thresholds for the level of cultural
homogeneity he or she requires for his or her autonomous expression. It does not aid in elucidating the
limits of exclusionary legislation.
51. See Perry, supra note 22, at 114.
52. U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("to form a more perfect union").
53. Perry, supra note 22, at 115.
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II. PROSCRIPTIONS ON SUB-NATIONAL PURSUIT OF CULTURAL COHESION
THROUGH CLOSURE
Having established that sub-national entities respond to national
immigration policy and that a cohesive culture helps stabilize
community institutions, this Article now turns to the method employed
by many sub-national communities in recent years to maintain their
cultural connectedness-closure and exclusion. The first two sub-
sections of Part II, debunk the first two assumptions built into the theory
of sub-national closure. Part II.A argues that closure will not succeed in
preserving the cultural status quo. That is, whatever current version of
culture a political community is attempting to protect, cannot be
maintained over time even if all immigrants and newcomers were
excluded. Part II.B then presents the constitutional and economic
constraints on achieving effective closure. Sub-national communities are
limited to economic deterrents that only roughly, if at all, help maintain
a distinctive dominant culture. Part II.C then critiques the judicially
created doctrine-the plenary power doctrine-courts used to evaluate
the viability of sub-national exclusionary legislation.
A. Cultural Preservation as a Self-Defeating Legislative Purpose
This section asserts that exclusion cannot effectively preserve a
particular community's culture as it exists at the moment of closure.
Relying on legal scholar Madhavi Sunder and her epistemological study
of the concept of culture in anthropology and law, 54 and the work of
political philosopher Samuel Scheffler, 55 I argue that even if a local
community could build a wall around it, either literally or legally, and
monitor its borders assiduously, it would not be able to preserve its
culture unchanged. As Professor Scheffler argues, a preservationist
project for a political community is self-defeating.56 Culture only
survives through evolution and adaptation over time. Localities trying to
resist change to their distinctive culture through exclusion and closure
engage in a futile and ultimately unfulfilling exercise.
First, a political community would have to agree on the version of its
culture it desires to defend and propagate through restrictive regulation.
54. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001).
55. Scheffler, supra note 37.
56. Id. at 107 ("Strong preservationism fails as a strategy ... because it fails to recognize that
change is essential to culture and to cultural survival, so that to prevent a culture from changing...
would not be to preserve the culture but rather to destroy it. In other words, strong preservationism is
self-defeating.").
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This preparatory task itself is difficult when one accounts for (1) the
temporal requirements of sustained cultural preservation over time,
57
and (2) the likelihood that incumbent community members entered the
community at different times. Only localities created by coordinated,
mass movement can claim to have all members experiencing roughly the
same cultural mode at the point of entry. Therefore, the version of
community culture each individual joined varies even between
incumbent members. Creating a community-wide endowment effect,
each individual within the community will claim entitlement to that
specific version of the community that existed when he or she joined, as
none will have experience of community culture prior to that moment.
But, the very act of joining, like a cultural Heisenberg uncertainty
principle,58 is certain to have altered that locality's culture.
Second, even assuming that individuals entering the community
across a period of time could agree on a base commonality of culture
going forward, they still would not succeed in faithfully preserving their
culture through closure. In Scheffler's thought experiment, even when
the community is hermetically sealed in an attempt to maintain a
specific version of culture, members would have to account for the
changes inevitably wrought by their children-the "immigrants from the
future ....,9 Walzer himself notes the analogy between migrants and
children, but fails to recognize that posterity will also act as agents of
cultural change. 60 Thus, his lament then that open national borders
without sub-national closure would lead to short shelf-lives for a
community's cohesive culture is overstated. Assuming closed borders,
the version of culture that bonds the local community today will not be
the same version that does so in a few generations. Indeed, even if the
state banned childbirth and sealed its borders, the inevitability of
"cultural dissent" among incumbent members, accompanied by the drive
for autonomy and human flourishing, would still galvanize cultural
modification.
61
On this point, incumbent members of the political community might
argue that they are willing to accept the cultural changes brought by
57. WALZER, supra note 22, at 39 ("Neighborhoods might maintain some cohesive culture for a
generation or two on a voluntary basis, but people would move in, people would move out; soon
cohesion would be gone.").
58. Jan Hilgevoord & Jos Uffink, The Uncertainty Principle, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2006), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/falt2006/entrie
s/qt-uncertainty/.
59. Scheffler, supra note 37, at 104.
60. WALZER, supra note 22, at 34 ("But it is worth noting first, briefly, that there are certain
similarities between strangers in political space (immigrants) and descendants in time (children).").
61. Sunder, supra note 54, at 498.
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their own children or their own internal disagreement, but not those of
undocumented migrants. But once the ground is ceded that culture of a
locality and a political community will change, it is unclear why change
from one source is unqualifiedly acceptable whereas change from
another is unequivocally not. The inevitability of cultural change even
within closed political systems belies the argument that cultural status
quo is necessary for the survival of a community's political and social
institutions.
Moreover, the U.S. cannot become a closed system. This Article has
thus far implicitly conceived of federal political authority as actively
choosing whether to allow immigration and undocumented migration,
and possessing the potential to hermetically seal the border if it so
wanted. Increasingly, such absolute control appears to be fantasy.
62
Undocumented migrants from Mexico and other Central and South
American countries cross the border fully cognizant of the possibility of
death and permanent separation from loved ones. 63 Neither that stark
reality nor the increased border vigilance has suppressed the hydraulic
push and pull of globalized markets, economic opportunity, and
individual rights that draw immigrants.64  Recent reductions in
undocumented immigrant volume are just as, if not more, attributable to
downturns in the U.S. economy as they are to effective border policy.
65
Thus, cultural change is certain; posterity, internal cultural dissent, and
inevitable global migration are its unstoppable agents.
Even taking the charitable view of the federal government's potential
for national border control, only a minority believe that the U.S. would
be better-off as a closed system without any immigration. 66 Even vocal
anti-immigration activists concede that legalized immigration flows are
62. See, e.g., Johnson & Hing, supra note 22, at 1350 ("[I]mmigration is a function of economic,
social, and political pressures that are not wholly within any one nation's sovereign control. Closed
borders simply are not a policy option in the United States today.").
63. See CORNELIUS, ET AL., supra note 5; RAQUEL RUBIO-GOLDSMITH, ET. AL., IMMIGRATION
POL'Y CTR., A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AT THE BORDER: NEW ESTIMATES OF DEATH AMONG
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS 2-4 (2007), http://immigration.server263.com/images/File/brief/Crisis%2
0at0/20the%20Border.pdf.
64. Howard F. Chang, Cultural Communities in a Global Labor Market: Immigration
Restrictions as Residential Segregation, 2007 U. CI. LEGAL. F. 93, 96; David M. Kennedy, Can We
Still Afford to Be a Nation of Immigrants?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1996, at 52, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/19961 I/immigration.
65. Julia Preston, Reduction Seen in Number of People Here Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2008,
at A14 ("The [conclusion that strong immigration enforcement caused the decline was] questioned by
other demographers and economists, who said the decline might be less than.. . reported and was more
likely the result of the weak economy, especially in low-wage construction and manufacturing where
illegal immigrants are generally employed.").
66. PEW HISPANIC CTR., NO CONSENSUS ON IMMIGRATION PROBLEM OR PROPOSED FixES:
AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION QUANDARY 26-33 (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/63.pdf.
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often beneficial to the country, and that their concern is with
uncontrolled undocumented migration. Under the current immigration
code, roughly 1.3 million immigrants legally enter the U.S. every year,
67
including use of visa allocations and admittance of direct family.68
National policy then, is to recognize the inevitability of, or at least allow
for, cultural change through admission of new, documented members.
Since the U.S. does not control birthrate, and the Constitution protects
parents' rights to raise their child without excessive state coercion,69 our
national rule is to supplement immigrant-caused cultural modification
with that caused by immigrants from the future.
While change might be inevitable, and its sources varied, incumbent
members might still argue that cultural evolution through their offspring
and their internal dissent is controlled and gradual, and therefore not
injurious to the cohesion that culture provides. Each member will only
produce a limited number of children, and those children will be raised
in homes, schools, and institutions that share a common base of values
and practices informed by their forbears. Immigration, on the other
hand, can import entire families at a time. In addition, those families will
arrive with traditions, practices, and understandings of political
institutions that could be drastically different from those of the
incumbent political community. Thus, while both incumbents and
migrants modify community culture, they differ in the quality and
degree of that alteration.
The degree and rapidity of cultural change caused by mass
immigration is the only legitimate legislative concern for sub-national
political communities trying to maintain a cohesive culture. According
to Perry:
[T]he core issue here appears to be the rate of cultural change, not the
preservation of an existing culture or cultural mix. What is at stake is
cultural continuity rather than the substance of the dominant culture or
cultures.... [C]ultural change, whether in the form of cultural
diversification or transformation within a dominant culture, must be
sufficiently gradual as to ensure social and political stability.
70
The possibility of upheaval caused by too drastic of a cultural shift, may
endanger political institutions and community cohesion. Thus, a
locality's exclusion of putative members, when the rate of cultural
change would destabilize governing institutions and exceed the capacity
67. MIGRATION POL'Y INST., ANNUAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: THE REAL
NUMBERS 1 (2007), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS16_USImmigration_051807.pdf.
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
69. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
70. Perry, supra note 22, at 114.
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of community to integrate new members, 7' is the sole legitimate goal of
a preservationist project by a sub-national entity.
Restating the legitimate legislative goal vis-A-vis preservation of a
distinctive culture, localities are entitled to exclude outsiders only when
new entrants would foment de-stabilizing cultural change. That moment,
however, is hypothetical and distant. 72 In our instant moment, sub-
national exclusion of immigrants cannot and will not faithfully preserve
any particular version of culture, assuming that incumbent members
could agree on the iteration of culture they want to preserve. At most,
such closure can minimize cultural rate change. Stripped down to this
modest goal, sub-national political communities may very well decide
that their pursuit is no longer worthwhile. Combined with the limitations
on the manner in which they might pursue closure, discussed in Part II.B
below, localities will likely opt not to pursue cohesion through
exclusion, regardless of national border policy.
B. Constitutional and Economic Obstacles to Sub-national Closure
Despite the impossibility of preserving the cultural status quo, sub-
national communities may still choose to pursue the modest goal of
cultural change-minimization through closure and exclusion. It would
caricature the perspective of sub-national entities to suggest that they
strive for complete closure and insularity. However, their restrictive
regulation represents their attempts to substantially exclude non-
incumbents from their jurisdictions.
Section 1 below surveys the constitutional prohibitions on public and
private exclusion based on the culturally significant factors of ethnic
background, religious faith, and linguistic commonality. Sub-national
communities, whether through public policy or private action, will face
significant legal and practical obstacles to achieving substantial closure
along these axes. Unable to exclude through racial, religious, and
linguistic prohibitions, communities must resort to economic means to
bar undocumented persons. Section 2 critiques the use of economic
rationales, including zoning, as a method to keep out undocumented
persons, arguing that, to the extent these methods are constitutional, they
ineffectively promote cultural cohesion.
71. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 38, at 136 (noting scholarly literature arguing that the U.S. has
an "immigration" policy, but no "immigrant" policy for integration).
72. Perry, supra note 22, at 104.
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1460 2008-2009
2009] SUB-NATIONAL IMMIGRATIONREGULATION 1461
1. Constitutional Proscriptions on Culture-Based Exclusion
Any pursuit of cultural distinction must avoid using "culture" as a
proxy for ethnic and religious homogeneity, or other basis antithetical to
the liberal democratic principles underlying the Constitution.73 Here, the
Article briefly surveys constitutional constraints on the sub-national
closure pertaining to three of the most recognizable signifiers of cultural
identity: racial and ethnic makeup, religious background, and linguistic
commonality. In light of U.S. history, justifying local pursuit of cultural
commonality along these axes carries with it the danger that racist and
xenophobic sentiments will masquerade as the goal of cultural
preservation. 74 As such, sub-national communities face substantial
constitutional hurdles when attempting to preserve their dominant
culture through exclusionary policies meant to substantially protect
homogeneity of race, religion, or language.
The attempt to envision America as a distinct racial community at the
national level, 75 followed by attempts to recreate that character at the
sub-national level,76 was ultimately stymied by the constitutional
amendments and jurisprudence of the late-nineteenth and mid-twentieth
centuries. The landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education77 and its
progeny prohibited localities from maintaining racially segregated
facilities. 78 The Twenty-fourth Amendment, prohibiting all levels of
73. WALZER, supra note 22, at 40.
There are nations that use racial or ethnic criteria for membership within the political
community, or as a marker of a distinct political community. For example, membership in Greece is
heavily dependent on Greek descent, with limited opportunities for non-Greeks to achieve the same. See
Kodikas Ellenikes Ithageneias [KEI] [Code of Greek Citizenship] (Greece), available at
http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/AuthoritiesAbroad/North+AmericaUSA/EmbassyWashington/en-US/C
onsular+Services/Citizenship+-+Passports/Greek+Nationality/. The Republic of Korea until recently,
mandated that social science books teach that all Koreans were united by one-blood without mixture of
other ethnicities. This notion of ethnic purity and superiority has recently come under revision in Korea
due to the effects of globalization, which has brought spouses from many neighboring countries into
familial and blood ties with its native citizens. Korea's response to increased and varied immigration has
thus far been to modify its sponsorship of the myth of national racial distinctiveness, rather than create
closed sub-national communities. See All Things Considered: South Korea Tackles Multiculturalism
(NPR broadcast June 23, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyl
d=91819092.
74. Chang, supra note 64, at 128 n.129; Karla M. McKanders, From "Coloreds Only" to
"Solamente Ingles, " the Movement to Dismantle Second Class Citizenship for Jim Crow Blacks and
Juan Crow Browns (forthcoming) (on file with author).
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 36.
76. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8-17 (2004) (discussing Jim Crow laws); Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century ofAmerican Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
77. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) supplemented by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
78. See id.
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government from instituting poll taxes and levies on the franchise,79
further undermined the racial exclusivity of the American citizenry by
preventing wealth to substitute as a proxy for race at the voting booth.
Finally, in addition to these measures that prohibited jurisdictions from
segregating and disenfranchising to maintain distinctive racial
communities, the Court's anti-miscegenation ruling in Loving v.
Virginia,80 prohibited states and localities from attempting to maintain
racial purity in future generations through the regulation of marriage.8'
The racial composition of children-future members of the community
who may change its cultural character-could not be determined by the
state.
Yet, these constitutional movements only determined a political
community's ability to harness the power of the state to cement racially
homogenous localities through coerced exclusion. They, by themselves,
did not control what private individuals might do to maintain racial
distinctiveness within their communities. In attempts to maintain the
racial composition of their communities, whites included racially
restrictive covenants in their contracts to prevent property from being
transferred to putative non-white members. Interpreting minimal levels
of government involvement to suffice for constitutional review, Shelley
v. Kramer prohibited racially restrictive covenanting, forcing previously
distinct neighborhood to open their doors to all-comers.83
Having been stripped of governmental and private means of striving
for distinctiveness by race, communities still desirous of racial
differentiation are left with voluntary, individual private action that can,
at best, only roughly stand as a proxy for racially distinctive public
policy. Accompanying the aftermath of desegregation, enfranchisement,
and anti-miscegenation decisions, white Americans exponentially
increased their move to the suburbs. 84 Currently, the suburb-urban
divide in America reflects de facto distinctiveness in local communities
by race. 85 Constitutional rulings regarding wealth classifications may
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
80. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
81. See id.
82. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
83. See id.
84. DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH, 1820-2000,
at 283 (2003).
85. Chang, supra note 64, at 112-13 (citing David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaesser, Are Ghettos
Good or Bad?, 112 Q. J. ECON. 827 (1997), and Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Integration Game, 100 COLUM L. REV. 1965, 1966 (2000)). But see Eric Klinenberg, Bourgeois
Dystopias, NATION, June 28, 2004, at 40 ("The majority of new immigrants, and increasing numbers of
African-Americans, gays and the poor, are settling down outside the city lines.").
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help encourage such separation by allowing wealth to stand-in for race, 86
but local communities have no legally viable claim for racial
distinctiveness qua racial distinctiveness in their communities. In short,
this form of cultural cohesion cannot be pursued by a political
community using legislative means even with more open national
borders that would invariably allow immigrants from Latin American,
Asian, and African countries.
The elision between culture and race is especially worrisome given
the origin of most immigrants today. Unlike historical patterns from the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, immigration over the past few
decades hails mainly from Mexico, China, India, Vietnam, Philippines,
Korea, and the Dominican Republic. 87 As of 2006, of the 12.5% of the
U.S. population that were foreign-born, approximately 80% were non-
European. 88 Any exclusionary policy, either at national or sub-national
levels, produces a pronounced racialized effect even when the legislation
does not expressly mention racial categories. While racially neutral
policies with racially disparate effects are not prohibited,89 immigration
regulation may pose a special case. 90 Given world populations and
economic conditions, those percentages will only skew further in the
direction of overwhelming racialized effect. It is possible that at such
high percentages, exclusion based on undocumented status would
receive heightened judicial scrutiny. 91 Even now, coercive and forceful
governmental action intended to reach "only" undocumented migrants
has caused general racial profiling, with citizens and legal permanent
residents wrongfully detained in immigration enforcement actions.
92
Like race, religious homogeneity can also contribute significantly to a
86. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (finding no equal protection violation in a California
referendum procedure allowing majoritarian control over public-housing regulations that use wealth
classifications, as wealth is not a suspect classification and the California procedure did not target racial
minorities per se).
87. Kennedy, supra note 64, at 66.
88. PEw HISPANIC CTR., STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2006 tbl.6 (2008), http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/foreignbom2006/Table-6.pdf
89. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a disparate racial effect was
insufficient to constitute an equal protection claim under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution).
90. See George A. Martinez, Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shift?, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 517 (assessing treatment of race in immigration literature).
91. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (declaring unconstitutional a facially neutral
redistricting that led to the elimination of 99% of blacks from a previously mixed electoral district); cf.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (declaring unconstitutional a facially race-neutral regulation
of laundries because regulation was used to almost exclusively prosecute Chinese-owned laundries).
92. Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, Sweeps Break the Rules, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE (Mesa,
Ariz.), Jul. 11, 2008; Daniel GonzAlez, US. Citizens Claim Profiling, Join Lawsuit Against Sheriff
Arpaio, AZCENTRAL.COM, Jul. 17, 2008, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/07/l7/20080717p
rofiling0717.html.
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political community's self-perception as unique and distinct. 93 Religion
provides a space and time for cultural interaction, informs sexual and
ethical mores, and is itself a community institution in which members
participate and showcase civic spirit. For many, it can be the primary
source of self-identification, superseding national and racial ties.94 While
religious solidarity could contribute significantly to cultural cohesion,
religious homogeneity is an impermissible legislative objective for either
national or sub-national governments. 95 In fact, religious heterogeneity
and a dogged resistance of religious hegemony have kept America
unique;96 our religious distinctiveness stems from the very disparateness
religious regulation would undermine. Therefore, even though cultural
cohesiveness may well be instrumentally important to a political
community's stability and survival, it cannot be achieved through
religious mandates.
In their own membership decisions, churches and religious
organizations can deny membership to individuals based on an
individual's stated religious affiliation.97 However, beyond the physical
building of the house of worship itself and privately-owned land,
religious organizations cannot lay claim to exclusive dominion over
shared geo-political territory. The Supreme Court struck down such an
attempt when it stopped the New York state government from defining a
city district so as to allow a specific Jewish sect to exclude outsiders
from using the region's schools. 98 A given religious community has a
right of association which includes a right to disassociate, or not offer
membership to, outsiders who do not share their faith, 99 but this is not
93. Saudi Arabia and Iran are two examples of countries with strict religious requirements for
membership. See, e.g., SAUDI ARABIA CONST. arts. 9, 13, 34.
94. Cf Scheffier, supra note 37, at 97.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96. The Moment of Truth: In Many Parts of the World, the Right to Change One's Belief Is
Under Threat, ECONOMIST, July 26, 2008, at 29-30 ("The promotion of religious liberty is an axiom of
American foreign policy .... But America's religious free-for-all is very much the exception, not the
rule, in human history-and increasingly rare.., in the world today.").
97. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (finding no violation of Title VII in a church-run business' refusal to hire
outside of its faith); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (2006) (exempting religious organizations from Civil Rights
laws, providing in relevant part, "[t]his subchapter shall not apply to... a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities").
98. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (ruling that a
N.Y. statute creating a school district with its borders contiguous with the village of Kiryas Joel, an
enclave for a particular Jewish sect, violated the Establishment Clause because it intended to allow a
religious community to exclude outsiders' access to public institutions).
99. Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (ruling that an organization has a First
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the equivalent of being able to enclose and insulate a neighborhood or
locality from outsiders. A migrant's inability to join a specific religious
faith or place of worship does not inhibit the ability of that migrant to
reside, or participate economically, in the locality.' 00
Religious communities such as the Mormons 1°' are instructive in this
regard. Mormons coalesce in a few discreet geographic areas in the U.S,
with Salt Lake City, Utah remaining the largest population. 0 2 Because
they have decided to tie their religious community to a large
metropolitan area, Mormons cannot control the religious background of
those who wish to live as their neighbors. Because they constitute a
significant plurality of Utah's population, however, Mormons have
successfully incorporated some aspects of their belief system into public
policy. 10 3 These regulations and norms certainly make Utah and Salt
Lake City distinct from other political communities, but the Mormons as
a religious community have no entitlement to the persistence of these
norms based on their religious beliefs. Majoritarian values in the future
could overturn these legislative pronouncements if sufficient new
members to the Salt Lake City and Utah communities do not adopt the
same values as the Mormons.
Moreover, even without constitutional constraints, religious
dominance or homogeneity is a non-starter for sub-national communities
Amendment right of association to deny membership to an individual who undermines the
organization's viewpoint).
100. In fact, religious organizations have been the most humane towards migrants in the wake of
more visible federal pursuit of undocumented migrants. See Samuel G. Freedman, Immigrants Find
Solace After Storm ofArrests, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at A9.
101. "Mormon" is the common name for a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints.
102. David E. Campbell & J. Quin Monson, Following the Leader?: Mormon Voting on Ballot
Propositions 2 (Notre Dame Univ. Program in Am. Democracy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 16,
2003), available at http://americandemocracy.nd.edu/working_papers/files/followingtheleader.pdf.
103. Id. at 1-3 (noting instances of Mormon voting affecting political outcomes, and specifically
detailing Mormon religious leaders' influence of 1968 Utah liquor law). Mormons make up about 80%
of Utah's legislature. Bob Bernick, Jr., First Step Toward Change in Liquor Law, DESERET NEWS (Salt
Lake City, Utah), May 29, 2008; James T. McHugh, A Liberal Theocracy: Philosophy, Theology, and
Utah Constitutional Law, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1515, 1564 (1997); Stephanie Mencimer, Theocracy in
America, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 27. Every member of the congressional delegation was
also a LDS member in 2001. Mencimer, supra, at 29. These figures are explained by the large majority
of Utahans being members of LDS, and the origin of Utah as a Mormon state after their persecution
across the rest of the country. McHugh, supra, at 1546, 1549, 1564. Even Utah's Constitution, while
seeming on the surface to be secular, has many hints at work-arounds of church-state separation
requirements. Id. at 1516. In 1992, there was an open attempt to break down the barriers between church
and state by amending the Utah Constitution to allow prayer before local government meetings. Alfred
C. Emory & John J. Flynn, Editorial, Rush to Amend Utah Constitution Invites Divisive Religious
Assault, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, May 11, 1992, at A9. This attempt failed, but was directed at amending
the portion of Utah's Constitution that was written specifically to allay fears of a Mormon theocracy
becoming part of the United States.
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responding to increased immigration. In the specific context of
undocumented migration into the U.S., religious protectionism appears
not to be a significant factor in exclusionary practices by local
communities because of demographic considerations. Most immigrants
to the U.S., whether undocumented or documented, share a Judeo-
Christian background with the majority of the current citizenry. 10 4 The
majority of immigrants generally, and the overwhelming majority of
undocumented immigrants specifically, are of Mexican descent and
identify themselves as Catholic, an identity shared with 24% of
incumbent Americans. 10 5 Although anti-Catholic vitriol directed mostly
at Irish migrants underpinned a significant part of American nativism in
the mid-nineteenth century,' 0 6 today Catholics have integrated into the
national polity. Current religious antipathy is mostly directed against
Muslims, 10 7  a group accounting for a negligible amount of
undocumented migration. 108
Further, sub-national attempts to limit membership based on religious
affiliation would be an odd response to increased immigration. Any
exclusion of putative members who share the same underlying religious
faith suggests that religion in that instance would be used as mere
pretext for developing community cohesion based on race or national
origin. Perhaps more fundamentally, other than specific niches of
American society, most current citizens are not overly concerned about
the religious identity of their nation or their locality. 0 9 A recent
nationwide study on religion in America revealed a trend towards
lessening religious fervor, and highly fluid beliefs among Americans. 110
Religion appears to be declining as the basis of community cohesion in
104. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESSES AND
POLICY 157-64 (6th ed. 2008); PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY (2008), http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf. Mexicans,
the largest minority population in the United States, and of whom an estimated 25% are undocumented,
are overwhelmingly Catholic. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, supra, at 48.
105. Id. at47-51.
106. Norman L. Friedman, Nativism, 28 PHYLON 408 (1967).
107. Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of
Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2004).
108. Steven A. Camarota, The Muslim Wave, 54 NAT'L REV. 24 (2002), available at http://www.c
is.org/articles/2002/sac830.htm.
109. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 104.
110. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 104, at 5 ("More than one-quarter of
American adults (28%) have left the faith in which they were raised in favor of another religion-or no
religion at all. If change in affiliation from one type of Protestantism to another is included, roughly
44% of adults have either switched religious affiliation, moved from being unaffiliated with any religion
to being affiliated with a particular faith, or dropped any connection to a specific religious tradition
altogether."); id. at 19 ("the number of Americans who are not affiliated with a religion has grown
significantly in recent decades").
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American life; if anything, undocumented migration overwhelmingly
from one religious background strengthens religious cohesiveness.
Even as homogeneity in race or religion-either as a legislative end
or a means-is prohibited by the constitution, sub-national communities
may aver to language in their statutes and constitutions as a means of
promoting distinctive culture and deterring would be residents. A
common language provides a base-level and fundamental commonality
that promotes cultural cohesiveness. By allowing members of the
community to communicate with little cost, a common language
facilitates both social and political interaction amongst incumbent
members, which in turn strengthens community bonds.111 And language,
unlike race or national origin, is a mutable characteristic.
Yet, sub-national language restrictions aimed at excluding migrants,
however, suffer from several flaws. While laws limiting undocumented
immigrant access to local services, housing, and employment facially
target only undocumented immigrants, "English as official language"
statutes, and "English only" aspirations indiscriminately affect many
immigrants and citizens of foreign birth or descent.1 12 Because English
related public policy affects foreign-born citizens, and documented and
undocumented immigrants alike, they merit judicial investigation to
determine if cultural preservation is their intended goal, or if they stand
as proxies for illegitimate animus. This is especially true because the
level of English fluency required to navigate the local political, social,
and economic terrain is fairly minimal. 
113
As a constitutional matter, sub-national governments' past attempts at
mandating English as the only spoken or taught language have been
struck down. 114 Although sub-national regulation cannot exclude
outsiders on the basis of language-ability, states and localities can and
have expressed English language-use as an aspiration for their
communities through "official language" statutes and state constitutional
amendments.' 15 Historically and recently, laws of this kind have been
the response to visible and growing immigrant populations, both legal
111. Chang, supra note 64, at 100; Cf Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23
CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 623 (1997).
112. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REv. 687, 748-51 (2006);
see also Kotlowitz, supra note 8 (noting that citizens and long-time Mexican-American residents of the
U.S. are feeling targeted by English-only ordinances).
113. Cf Appiah, supra note 111, at 633 & n.20.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404, 409 (1923).
115. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. DIX; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6(b) (1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 50-3-100 (2008) (creating an official English statute, with broad exceptions to avoid Constitutional
violations).
1467
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1467 2008-2009
1468 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol.77
and illegal in those communities. 1 6 But language in the aspirational
sense provides a thin basis for establishing distinctiveness and
cohesiveness in a local community. For certain governmental actions,
English-only laws would be inhumane, such as in criminal trials with
non-English speaking defendants who require translation.
Also, though linguistic homogeneity generally contributes to well-
functioning political institutions, it is often not in the government's
interest to limit itself or those interacting with it, to one language."1
7
Law enforcement and national security concerns are likely better
addressed when the government permits itself to speak with, and hear
from, individuals who may not speak English. 1 8 Moreover, English as a
secondary or even tertiary language would likely suffice to allow
understanding of political systems and institutions. 1 9 Indeed, if political
and civic participation is the goal, rather than mere exclusion, increased
language access for non-English speakers is a better path.
120
Even if sub-national governments are legally prohibited from
monolingual policies, privately-owned businesses may choose to interact
in English. Their desire to do so makes sense, as communication
problems could slow down transactions and require extra work from
business owners. 12 1 In addition, such signage signals to would-be
community members that the business owners value their distinctive
language more than the marginal dollars they gain from non-English
speaking clients. While such action by private businesses produces the
intended effect of excluding non-English speakers, any such effect
would certainly be temporary, given the English adoption rate by
immigrants over time. Polls consistently show that immigrants desire to
gain English skills, as it helps them communicate with their children
who may use English as their primary tongue, increases their economic
opportunities in the marketplace, and allows meaningful political
participation. 122 After a few years for the first generation, and by the
second and third generations, English adoption and fluency catches up to
116. See, e.g., Kotlowitz, supra note 8.
117. Rodriguez, supra note 112. Of course, a single language would save administrative costs for
governmental institutions. Chang, supra note 64, at 104-05.
118. See William Finnegan, The Terrorism Beat: A Reporter at Large, NEW YORKER, Jul. 25,
2005, at 58 (noting the use of Arabic language translators).
119. Appiah, supra note 111, at 633.
120. Rodriguez, supra note 112.
121. Jamie Coomarasamy, Philly Landmark Goes English-only, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/5127134.stm.
122. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of
Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10-12 (1998) (showing rapid
linguistic assimilation of immigrants over time).
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the native population. 123 Any success achieved by sub-national
communities, either through governmental or private action, to insulate
themselves from increased immigration through language distinctiveness
would, at best, be pyrrhic.
Sub-national entities pursuing cultural cohesiveness through
preservation of the dominant cultural status quo are thus placed in a
dilemma. Race, religion, and language form three of the most
identifiable constituent parts of culture, but are also constitutionally
suspect grounds for closure. Attempting to avoid these facially
impermissible bases, sub-national entities may instead attempt to
exclude based on economic deterrents. As argued below, however,
economic homogeneity does little to preserve a unique cultural cohesion
for incumbent members.
2. Economic Deterrents to Sub-national Closure
Constrained in their ability to build legal walls with racial, religious,
and linguistic bricks, sub-national communities increasingly turn to
economic regulation as a proxy for culture-based closure. This section
considers the possibility of effecting substantial closure through zoning
and economic regulation. First, it evaluates the potential for zoning in
ways that maintain the economic character of local communities,
arguing that, while it may concentrate wealth, it does very little to
preserve a distinct cultural commonality. Second, it considers
regulations meant as deterrents to undocumented residency and
presence, such as prohibitions on public assistance, employment, and
residency. In addition to posing as a proxy for culture-based exclusion,
there may be significant economic incentives for closure that constitute
independent justifications for barring undocumented immigrants. Still
these types of regulations may work too well, expelling documented and
undocumented immigrants and decimating the communities that enact
such measures. 124 Thus, these measures run the risk of destroying the
political community, rather than saving it, taking away the foundation
from which to promote either economic prosperity or cultural
dominance.
Local zoning prerogatives are long-entrenched powers that localities
and neighborhoods have used to separate themselves from other places
123. Id. at 12.
124. 1 want to note, however, that to conclusively make these arguments, this Article requires
empirical work that I do not provide. I do not intend to enter the complex debate regarding the
economics of undocumented migration. Instead, I note that some sub-national entities that have enacted
these restrictive laws are questioning the wisdom of their policy as their economic base has vanished.
1469
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1469 2008-2009
UNIVERSITY OF CINCIAWA TI LA W REVIEW [Vol.77
and keep undesirable people out. 12 5 Communities may seek to zone in
ways that encourage less affordable housing,1 26 limit the number of
persons per household, and increase property taxes. Zoning regulations,
although imperfect substitutes for outright exclusion, can help hoard
economic resources for incumbent community members. In addition,
they likely produce a disproportionate effect on undocumented persons.
By limiting the pool of potential community residents through zoning, a
local community could, for example, reduce the probability that local
emergency rooms will be used by anyone, including immigrants,
without insurance or financial solvency. 127  Additionally, such
regulations may produce collateral effects, such as reducing the number
of persons driving without insurance within the locality. 128
But while this drive to horde resources makes economic sense, from
the perspective of maintaining a distinct cultural bond, closure through
zoning is a debatable proposition. First and foremost, relying on
economic factors to justify local exclusion cedes much of the argument
for cultural maintenance through expulsion of migrants. At base, closure
on this reasoning relegates culture to nothing more than community
wealth protection, and its claim to control over the cultural rate change
limited to the empirical probability that migrants will enter and remain
destitute. 1
29
Zoning barriers may exclude undocumented migrants due to their
relative poverty, but they do little to protect or shield an identifiable
culture-apart from a culture of wealth-associated with a political
community occupying a determined geographic space. Quite simply, the
desire to preserve wealth and resource is not distinctive; it could form
125. Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1630
& n.33 (2008); Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation 11 (June 10, 2009)
(unpublished, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1416107) ("By imposing
zoning restrictions that prohibit apartments or multi-family developments, or requirements that impose
minimum lot sizes or square-footage, communities have used carefully-crafted zoning policies to drive
up housing costs and limit housing selection, with the added consequence of pricing out low and
sometimes moderate-income residents."); see also Viii. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
126. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-90 (1926).
127. Illegal Immigrant Births-At Your Expense, CBS NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.c
om/stories/2008/04/07/eveningnews/main40004Ol .shtml.
128. See Nina Bemstein, Spitzer Grants Illegal Immigrants Easier Access to Driver's Licenses,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at Al (noting that N.Y. drivers would save $120 million in insurance
premiums by reducing the number of uninsured drivers).
129. While this is likely true for new undocumented migrants who form part of the global labor
market in agricultural and meat-packing industries, the same is not true for new migrants (mostly
documented or with employment visas) in scientific and technology fields. Vivek Wadhwa et. al.,
America's New Immigrant Entrepreneurs 4-5 (Duke Science, Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23,
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--990152.
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the bond between any individual, from citizens to undocumented
persons, and a political community. Fundamentally, people create
governing structures at local and national levels to aid in the creation
and preservation of economic and public resources, and to effectively
regulate the distribution of those resources. 130 The desire to import
wealth while exporting costs cannot distinguish one neighborhood from
another, one state from another, or one nation from another. This is not
to argue that the relative affluence of a community is not or cannot
become a cohesive factor; Beverly Hills and the Upper East Side of
Manhattan provide ostentatiously easy examples. But, what has
distinguished those places is the success with which they have attracted
wealth, not the local community's desire to attract wealth and minimize
costs. While the distributional concerns regarding increased immigration
may spur localities to consider more policies that export costs, sub-
national political communities cannot preserve a particular cultural
status quo by doing so. They are in fact accessing a universal impulse at
all levels of government in all variety of nations to hoard resources for
current members. Counterintuitively, under this analysis, a sub-national
community engenders a unique bond amongst its members when it
decides to oppose the general trend and offer services to all people,
including undocumented migrants, without attempting to export the
costs to adjacent localities. 131
More to the point of Walzer's thesis, protectionism through zoning
and other economic deterrents occurs both in the presence and absence
of strictly controlled national borders. Undoubtedly, neighborhoods have
had some success using zoning and gated communities to preserve the
economic character of their surroundings.' 32 And, public policy that
treats the poor unequally, whether documented or undocumented, is
generally upheld against constitutional challenges.' 33 But, these
phenomena also occur during times of low immigration, when
undocumented migration is not a prominent fixture in the national
agenda. In fact, the first major move of middle income and wealthy
whites to the suburbs occurred during a time of relatively low
immigration to the U.S., when the immigration code prohibited Asian
immigration and kept strict racial quotas on other groups. 3 4 This
130. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
131. See infra Part I1.A (discussing states and localities that have chosen not to exclude
undocumented persons).
132. See generally Su, supra note 125, at 1649-51 (describing the availability of "neutral"
regulations of immigration, such as zoning).
133. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
134. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
1471
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suggests that a sub-national community's desire to maintain property
values and limit public assistance payouts will manifest so long as
wealth divisions persist in the national community, regardless of
immigration.
While zoning ordinances do not directly facially target undocumented
persons, the recent surge in immigration related ordinances expressly
restrict their access to public assistance, employment, and residency. As
with zoning regulations, these restrictions operate as a proxy for cultural
maintenance. However, given the complicated economics of
undocumented migration in the U.S., some communities may genuinely
feel that their exclusionary stance is purely economic and not cultural. 35
As between national and sub-national jurisdictions, undocumented
migration arguably produces disparate economic effects which in part
likely motivate sub-national entities to legislate.
The economic impact of undocumented migration eludes blanket
statements regarding the dysfunction, or alternatively, the windfall
migrants contribute to the nation's economic well-being. 136 As nation-
states in the international order move to increase free movement of
goods, services, and capital, it has become increasingly clear that
immigration rules that hinder free movement of labor "distort global
markets" and reduce total global welfare. 13 Within the U.S., even as
citizens complain of the economic strain and drain of undocumented
migrants, credible and voluminous data indicates that at the national
level, undocumented migrants add a significant amount to national
economic productivity. 138 At the local level, however, the data is mixed.
While some reports present net positive or neutral economic effects,
139
others argue that, given uncompensated emergency healthcare costs, law
enforcement costs, and other public services, undocumented migrants
produce net losses at the local level and exert downward pressure on
STATES 175 (1985) (citing AMOS H. HAWLEY, THE CHANGING SHAPE OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA:
DECONCENTRATION SINCE 1920 (1956)); HAYDEN, supra note 84, at 10.
135. Kotlowitz, supra note 8.
136. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 64, at 93-94; Jacoby, supra note 23, at 50; FISCAL POL'Y INST.,
A PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE NEW YORK STATE ECONOMY (2007), http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/pu
blications2007/FPIImmReportWorkingforaBetterLife.pdf, CAROLE KEETON STRAYHORN, TEXAS
COMPTROLLER, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN TEXAS: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT TO
THE SATE BUDGET AND ECONOMY (2006), http://www.window.state.tx.u s/specialrpt/undocumented.
137. Chang, supra note 64, at 94; see also Jonathan Todres, Lessons from the Trade Arena: A
Proposal to Change U.S. Immigration Law for the Benefit of US. Workers, I SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 49,
65 (2000).
138. See Jacoby, supra note 23, at 54-58 (noting that $7 billion in tax revenue and $154 billion in
economic growth was attributable to undocumented persons).
139. Id.
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wages. 140 The only currently available study undertaken by a sub-
national government focused specifically on the economic effects of
undocumented immigrants concludes that these migrants "generate more
taxes and other revenue than the state spends on them.",141 The Texas
Comptroller's report, however, does not document the net costs at the
local level.
Assuming, for argument's sake, that some local communities may
experience net losses from undocumented migration, especially when
expenses are not compensated by state or federal governments, the
disjunction between the loci of economic gains and losses would seem
to create perverse incentives. The federal government has diminished
economic incentive to create strict border policy and restrict migrant
flows, while the exact opposite is true at the local level. The recent surge
in local and state laws rendering those locales inhospitable for
undocumented migrants in part reflects this concentration of costs.
These regulations reduce incentives for undocumented immigrants to
settle in those localities by criminalizing the renting of property to them,
authorizing local police to inquire into immigration status, and
penalizing businesses for employing them. 142
Denial of public goods, services, housing, and employment to
undocumented persons can effectively exclude immigrants and
minimize cultural rate-change for a political community. Yet this has not
always proven to be wise policy. Some local efforts were rebuffed by
federal courts, 14 3 but other communities grew to reconsider their
exclusionary laws without legal sanction. They found their tactics
worked too well. These sub-national communities are regretting their
restrictions on undocumented persons in light of the unforeseen costs.
In 2006, Riverside, New Jersey joined the tide of states and localities
legislating to deter undocumented migration and continued presence in
their communities. 44 Within one year of enactment, however, Riverside
began to reconsider whether its regulations had served its polity's
welfare, and repealed them.' 45 While the legislation achieved its
intended effect-erecting a legal wall around the city and driving out
undocumented persons-its collateral and unforeseen consequences
devastated the economic and social life of the township. Businesses
140. Id.
141. STRAYHORN, supra note 136, at 1-2.
142. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
143. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521-29 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
144. Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Law Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2007, at Al; Maria Panaritis & Sam Wood, Riverside To Repeal Immigrant Laws,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 23, 2007, at B 1.
145. Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 144.
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closed up, either their proprietors or client-base decimated, and a
seemingly thriving town lost much of its vibrancy. 146 Similarly, on a
larger sub-national level, the state of Oklahoma is currently
reconsidering its restrictive laws. Oklahoma implemented its Taxpayer
and Citizen Protection Act of 2007 requiring the verification of
employment eligibility using the electronic employment verifications
system, which became effective November 1, 2007. Scarcely a month
later, a Republican state senator who had supported the bill, initiated an
effort to repeal part of the law because of its purported negative
economic impact. 14 7 Industry in many parts of Oklahoma relies heavily
on immigrant workers, both documented and undocumented, many of
whom left after passage of the law.
The self-inflicted economic woes in the city of Riverside and the state
of Oklahoma are, in one sense, proof that a legal fence can be erected-
immigrants are effectively kept out, and those already inside are deterred
by the inhospitability of their environs. The effectiveness of the legal
wall can help incumbent residents slow the rate of immigrant-induced
cultural change. Once immigrants leave, however, some sub-national
entities have second-guessed the wisdom of their exclusion.' 41 It turns
out they overstated some of the cultural and economic detriments of the
presence of undocumented migration and underestimated the cost of
expulsion.
These localities and states realize after exclusion the need to preserve
cultural and economic prospects, which they may have miscalculated in
five ways. First, they fail to realize the extent to which immigrants
constitute critical sectors of the economy, both on the labor side and on
the consumer side. 149 Second, although the community's political
rhetoric often takes pains to express derision only at undocumented
immigrants-and not foreigners or immigrants generally-legislation
aimed at undocumented persons is often read as a harbinger of prejudice
and xenophobia by lawful immigrants as well. 150 Even documented
persons like legal permanent residents know that a key difference
between them and U.S. citizens is that they can be deported and
146. Id.
147. Mick Hinton, GOP Senator Wants Part of Law Repealed, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 5, 2007, at
Al, available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articlelD=071205 1 AlhGOPs73808.
148. See, e.g., Nick Miroff, Citing Cost, Prince William Delays Immigrant Measures, WASH.
POST, Oct. 3, 2007, at Al.
149. They constitute a non-negligible part of the national economy. See generally Jacoby, supra
note 23, at 55-59.
150. See, e.g., Kotlowitz, supra note 8, at 37 (describing the reaction of Mexican-American U.S.
citizens to a political flyer targeting undocumented immigrants, stating "[w]hat so alarmed them is that it
felt less like a debate on illegal immigration than it did a condemnation of Hispanic culture").
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excluded from community structures in ways that citizens cannot.'51
Since they are not treated as "Americans in Waiting," but rather as
contractual beneficiaries whose entitlements can be altered by
majoritarian processes, 152 aggressively anti-undocumented-immigrant
actions and rhetoric cut dangerously close to anti-immigrant action in
general. Third, and relatedly, an estimated 1 in 10 families with children
in the U.S. is a "mixed-status" family, made up of documented and
undocumented individuals. 153 In response to regulations that exclude
their family members, citizens and documented persons of immigrant
descent do not place their loyalty to their neighborhood above bonds of
blood. Thus, while it is easy for sub-national regulation to facially
restrict only undocumented individuals, it is virtually impossible to
avoid affecting documented immigrants and citizens.
Fourth, restrictive state and local responses to the lack of new national
regulation galvanized coalitions of strange political bedfellows.
Mainline civil rights groups, business and industry leaders, local law
enforcement, and unions all oppose stringent sub-national regulation. 54
These groups, for disparate reasons, coalesce against the notion of
national and sub-national unfriendliness towards undocumented persons,
and will likely oppose future measures at both the federal and sub-
federal levels. The spectrum of interests opposing exclusion reflects the
degree to which undocumented migration has become a part of our
national narrative and daily life. Finally, the exodus of undocumented
persons, their families, and other immigrants leaves cultural and social
voids, demonstrating by absence the influence those persons exerted on
the culture of a community. The reality is that if the presence of
undocumented immigrants is substantial enough to motivate legislation,
it is likely that those persons have already modified community culture
and become integral to the stability and survival of that community. The
social and cultural space the political community was attempting to
protect was one that was always partially constituted by the very people
whose exclusion that type of protection mandates.
151. ALEINIKOFF, ET AL., supra note 104, at 689-722 (providing basis for deportation); Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (allowing a state to exclude non-citizens from serving as state police).
152. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING (2006) (arguing that the U.S. should return to
a conception of legal permanent residents as "Americans in Waiting" where they are afforded
membership rights similar to national citizens).
153. MICHAEL E. Fix & WENDY ZIMMERMAN, URBAN INST., ALL UNDER ONE ROOF: MIXED-
STATUS FAMILIES IN AN ERA OF REFORM (1999), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/409100.pdf.
154. Krissah Williams, Labor Groups, Business Seek Immigration Law Overhaul, WASH. POST,
Jan. 20, 2007, at D1 ("Worried that surprise raids are driving away workers who are their lifeblood,
businesses are pooling their money and joining unusually broad alliances that include labor unions and
civil rights groups to push Congress to overhaul the nation's immigration laws.").
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In sum, although sub-national zoning and economic regulation may
hinder migrants from crossing sub-national borders, they neither
effectively promote cultural cohesion nor do they generally achieve the
ends they intend. Moreover, as critiqued in the next section, the recent
sub-national regulations are in danger of being declared unconstitutional
under the federal plenary power doctrine.
C. Overlapping Membership Communities and Problem of Plenary
Federal Power
Thus far, in Parts II.A and II.B, this Article has argued that sub-
national closure cannot preserve the cultural status quo, and that
communities are restricted to economic deterrents in their attempts to
preserve culture through exclusion. This section takes up the economic
regulations that are evaluated by courts using the preemption doctrine
and federal plenary immigration power. Considering these laws which
purport to deny public assistance, employment, and residency to
undocumented persons, courts have struck down some exclusionary
legislation, but have upheld others. 155 Regardless of the legal outcome,
courts have evaluated these regulations in a manner that misunderstands
the nature of community membership in the United States. The current
judicial conception of power differential between federal and sub-federal
entities perpetuates the causal feedback loop between national border
control and sub-national reactions. Ultimately, with a more accurate and
contemporary understanding of membership, the exclusionary power of
both national and sub-national entities should be constrained, eradicating
the judicially-created link between national border laxity and sub-
national attempts at legal closure.
The crux of my contention here is that the theorized causal link
between national border policy and sub-national response does not
adequately account for the impact that outdated judicial interpretations
exert on the relationship between the multiple levels of political
community. Federal plenary immigration power and its
operationalization in the preemption doctrine create significant
asymmetries between national and sub-national authority vis-i-vis
immigrants. 156 Although power differential between federal and sub-
155. Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521-29 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (striking
down ordinance), with Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07-CV-00881, 2008 WL 294294, at * 18-19
(E.D. Mo. 2008) (upholding ordinance); see also Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local
Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at A22.
156. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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federal entities is an ingrained feature of our constitutional order,157 its
unchecked operation in the field of immigration causes special concern.
Tracing the lineage of the plenary power doctrine from its origins,
Professor Stephen Legomsky argues that it grew out of the Supreme
Court's improper reliance on prior federalism cases. 158 In essence, the
Court was reacting to state excesses from other constitutional areas.
In the immigration arena, however, with no significant judicial check
on federal action, the plenary power doctrine has permitted federal
excesses. As a historical matter, the federal government is just as likely
as sub-federal units to exclude on the basis of ethnic group or national
origin in the name of cultural preservation. 159 From 1921 until 1965, the
U.S. immigration code expressly excluded migrants from Asian
nations, and allowed Mexican immigration under a guest-worker
program that limited the legal membership ties those immigrants could
develop in the U.S. 16 1 Underlying restrictive legislation in the first
instance were notions about the cultural effect and inadaptability of
foreigners from ethnic backgrounds different from the incumbent
cultural majority.' 62 Although Congress rescinded racial admission
quotas with its 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, no
constitutional or judicial rule prevents a return to that draconian
period. 1
63
The problem with this asymmetrical evaluation is that it ignores three
vital and emerging realities. First, as this Article has already argued,
preserving the cultural status quo is a self-defeating proposition.
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
158. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN
AND AMERICA 42-73 (1987).
159. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 104, at 163-76.
160. Id.
161. KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE
I.N.S. (1992).
162. Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571, 580-81 (2007)
("[A]ithough we remember exclusions as having been status-based, they were in fact premised upon
assumptions about normative behavior.").
163. See Frank H. Wu, The Limits of Borders: A Moderate Proposal for Immigration Reform, 7
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 35, 43 (1996). But see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power. Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549
(1990) (arguing that phantom norms and interpretation avoiding constitutional holdings have allowed
the Supreme Court to avoid some excesses of the plenary power doctrine).
I am not arguing that such an attempt is likely or would be successful. As Dean Kevin
Johnson and Professor Bill Ong Hing note, "in light of the modem civil rights consciousness... blanket
prohibitions on the immigration of certain races or national origins [are not] generally viable." Johnson
& Hing, supra note 22, at 1350. Even so, a consequence of the plenary power doctrine is nearly
unfettered, unchecked decision-making power in the hands of the political branches. Presumably our
evolved consciousness, economic deterrents, and foreign policy reprisals would prevent such a return.
But, these are prudential cautions, not constitutional constraints on sovereign power.
1477
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1477 2008-2009
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol.77
Cultures will change, especially in this globalized world where
migration often ignores formal national boundaries. This ineffable law
of cultural evolution applies with equal force at all levels of political
community, declining to distinguish local borders from that of the
nation-state. Therefore, it makes little sense to permit the federal
government to engage in an unconstrained preservationist exercise at the
national border, but disallow the same at the sub-national level.
Second, the judicially-created imbalance is itself constitutive of the
very phenomena it purports to resolve. While preemption may, in many
cases, produce the same result as other possible constitutional bases at
the sub-national level, 164 it creates an odd dynamic between federal and
non-federal political communities vis-a-vis questions of inclusion and
membership. When states and localities believe the federal government
can legitimately build high, restrictive walls to exclude outsiders, but
does not do so, they fill that void. They view themselves vindicating the
extent of the unfulfilled federal exclusionary potential.
Plenary power readings, then, limit the size of the walls sub-national
entities can construct, but allows the nation to erect walls-literally and
legally-of any height. The effect is to signal that draconian barriers are
permissible outlets for the exclusionary impulse of political
communities, but then deny the ability to act on that impulse to the level
of political community where individuals most acutely experience
membership concerns. Sub-national communities, witnessing the wall-
building power of the federal government lying fallow, have attempted
to erect their own legal borders to the same height that they perceive the
nation could. This Article argues, however, that federal power vis-a-vis
outsiders should be constrained similarly to sub-national power,
reducing the gap between them. Thus, sub-national communities will not
view themselves as proxies for unexercised federal authority.
Third, and relatedly, the changing global landscape and increasing
importance of both trans-national and sub-national memberships,
165
militate against exclusive reliance on, and unfettered power for, the
national political community as the site of cultural connectedness.
Plenary national immigration power discounts the importance of the
multiple and overlapping memberships that all inhabitants of the U.S.
164. David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31
STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1070-73 (1979).
165. Ford, supra note 28, at 210 ("[National citizenship[ is] under attack, not from one, but from
two opposite vectors: one toward multinational and global affiliations that transcend the nation-state,
and one toward subnational, regional, and local affiliations that fracture the nation-state."); see also
Yishai Blank, Spheres of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411 (2007) (arguing that both local
and international realms of membership are gaining importance vis-A-vis the national sphere).
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possess. 166 Membership, and the desire to distribute it, matters equally at
the local level as at the national level. 167 In a rapidly globalizing world
and in recent decades that have ushered several free-trade agreements,
citizens will seek to find political spaces in which they can exert some
control. 168 Increasingly, the city is the locus of these efforts to regain
order and control, as national policies skew in favor of free movement of
capital and goods and outsourced labor. 169 In recent decades, the U.S.
has become more politically and ideologically polarized than before, and
such differentiation is reflected in residential and geographic patterns.
170
Concurrently, membership is also expanding internationally, as
individuals become a part of transnational movements and
organizations, 17 1 and find protection and prosecution from legal regimes
beyond that of the nation-state. 172 When non-national memberships are
imbued with these important meanings, it cannot be that the national
community accretes significantly more exclusionary power than sub-
national ones.
In addition, the citizenry of the neighborhoods, cities, and states
enacting legislation meant to exclude undocumented persons are also
part of the political community voting for the presidential administration
and federal representatives charged with creating national border policy.
Inaction at the federal level 173 reflects a combination of the deep national
ambivalence towards undocumented migration, 174 the power of interest
166. BOSNIAK, supra note 30, at 18-36; Ford, supra note 28, at 218 ("The residents of global
cities, however, have cultural and economic ties to the global village that can be as strong as their ties to
their national capitals.").
167. Cf. WALZER, supra note 22, at 31 ("The primary good that we distribute to one another is
membership in some human community.").
168. Saskia Sassen, The Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics,
CENTENNIAL REV., Summer 2003, at 57-58; Kristine Crane, The City as an Arena for the Expression of
Multiple Identities in the Age of Globalisation and Migration, (FEEM Working Paper No, 73, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractId=46338 1.
169. See generally Chang, supra note 64; Ford, supra note 28.
170. BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT (2008) (noting increase in "landslide" counties during election
time and positing that the polarization of politics is due to a movement of people into like-minded
communities resulting in more radicalized beliefs and political views); Kathleen Sullivan, From States'
Rights Blues to Blue States' Rights: Federalism After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799
(2006).
171. See sources cited supra notes 164, 165.
172. Ford, supra note 28, at 218-24; Ramji-Nogales, supra note 30, at 324-44. But see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Between National and Post-National: Membership in the United States, 4 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 241 (1999) (arguing that notions of post-national membership are premature).
173. "Inaction" itself is a temporally limited description. Although Congress failed to come to
new legislation in 2006, the federal govemment has acted comprehensively in regards to immigration in
the past. See 8 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006); ALEINIKOFF, ET AL., supra note 104.
174. See PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 66.
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groups, 175 and the incentives created by net federal economic gains. It
also signifies that the national political community, acting through
representatives, does not consider migration a serious danger to the
integrity of American culture. And, nationwide, undocumented migrants
constitute only 3% of the population. Although a non-negligible portion
of the population, those migrants cannot create drastic or de-stabilizing
cultural change in our national political institutions.
The greater concentrations of migrants in local political
communities,' 76 however, create greater possibility of more acutely felt
economic and cultural effects. It is only at the. local level, in
neighborhoods and cities, where incumbent cultural majorities must
share residential, economic, and socio-cultural spaces with those they
would rather exclude. 177 The erection of legal entry barriers at the local
level is an articulation by local citizenry that their preferences did not
find voice on the national stage. 178 Their response then, expresses their
belief that, with regards to local distributional welfare and local culture,
their more immediate political community takes precedence over the
national one. In striking down exclusionary local regulation, however,
courts wrongly dictate that the membership decisions of sub-national
entities do not matter as much as national membership.
Recent changes in welfare law illustrate the incongruity of this
imbalanced judicial understanding of exclusionary power and
membership. While sub-national discretion to regulate in the
membership and immigration arena has remained constrained by notions
of federal plenary power, sub-national decision-making authority with
regards to public assistance has greatly increased. The 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Reorganization Act (PRA) and its
accompanying Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
devolved welfare program decision-making to the state level, including
the decision whether to provide benefits to non-citizens. 1 79 In returning
175. Christian Joppke, Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration, 50 WORLD POL. 266,
273-74(1998).
176. Ford, supra note 28, at 217 ("[M]ajor cities are cultural and political bases for ethnic
subgroups and minorities that are too small to gain significant power at the national level.").
177. Id.; see also Sassen, supra note 168, at 57 ("The loss of power at the national level produces
the possibility for new forms of power and politics at the subnational level. The national as container of
social process and power is cracked. This cracked casing opens up possibilities for a geography of
politics that links subnational spaces. Cities are foremost in this new geography. One question this
engenders is how and whether we are seeing the formation of new types of politics that localize in these
cities."); Crane, supra note 168.
178. See Chang, supra note 64, at 117-18.
179. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493,496 (2001).
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1480 2008-2009
2009] SUB-NATIONAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION
control over public assistance programs to sub-national levels,' 80 the
PRA altered the significance of citizenship and the locus of membership
concerns. By devolving control over distributions to states-which in
turn could devolve the decision further down to localities-the PRA
increased the likelihood that sub-national entities would begin to make
membership decisions, attempting to exclude those with whom they did
not want to share their collective economic gains. 18 1
Against this backdrop of globalization and devolved welfare
concerns, a legal rationale that ignores the growing importance of
membership distribution at transnational and sub-national levels is too
blunt a mechanism. Undocumented migration combined with welfare
devolution spurs sub-national closure in ways that it might not have had
undocumented migration been paired with the pre-PRA national welfare
system. 182 Under the pre-PRA system, a more substantial portion of
economic costs and gains from undocumented migrants would be netted
at the national level, without disparate concentrations of windfalls and
expenditures. In short, localities may not respond to increased national
immigration through closure if their public assistance expenditures are
compensated from the federal level where gains are recouped.
As the notion of absolute sovereign power wanes and membership at
ultra-national and sub-national levels waxes, treatment of undocumented
immigrants warrants parameters that mirror international and sub-
national standards. However, so long as courts remain incognizant of the
importance of multiple membership concerns, they will continue using
the preemption doctrine to invalidate local attempts at excluding
undocumented persons, but allow the national community the latitude to
keep immigration low, build fences, and contemplate guest-worker
programs. As courts develop a more realistic understanding of these
stratified, but superimposed membership units, they will be forced to
develop nuanced tools to measure exclusionary policy at both national
and sub-national levels. The likely source of these tools will be
developed from general national and international norms regarding the
treatment of individuals seeking access to vital rights and benefits,
including membership.' 
83
180. Id. Note also that federal welfare began in 1935. Prior to that, states and localities controlled
public assistance and residency was the primary factor in determining benefits. ICHAEL B. KATZ, IN
THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (rev. ed., 1996).
181. WALZER, supra note 22, at 38.
182. Id. ("Where welfare monies are raised and spent locally.., the local people will seek to
exclude newcomers who are likely welfare recipients.").
183. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the
Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 948-55 (2007). Also, the ruling in Lozano v. Hazelton places
in jeopardy similar laws enacted in other localities. Although it might have used equal protection and
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Thus, under a legal regime that accounts for the increasing
importance of non-national membership arenas, exclusionary potential at
all levels should be constrained. Under the current judicial scheme,
which bluntly elevates national decision-making over membership, sub-
national entities rush to fill the void they perceive to exist when the
national community does not fully utilize its exclusionary power.
Eliminating the disparity between the levels of governments curbs the
discontent some localities feel when they witness inaction at the federal
level. Given that the national community, like a sub-national one, cannot
preserve cultural status quo through exclusion, and that membership
concerns, especially in light of devolved welfare decision-making,
matter significantly for sub-national jurisdictions, there should be little
disparity between exclusionary possibilities at either level.
Importantly, the fact that national and sub-national governments are
constrained in their ability to pursue cultural distinctiveness need not be
an argument for open borders. It does, however, argue for a much more
liberal admission policy, bounded by factors that will be discussed in
further detail below.18 4 This Article has thus far argued that such an
immigration policy cannot lead to local closures that seek to preserve
culture. First, the goal of cultural preservation is itself elusive, leaving
communities with the modest potential to influence the rate of its
change. Second, localities are prohibited from seeking closure in ways
that preserve the cultural status quo. Part III considers how sub-national
communities actually react to increased immigration, and on what basis
they may continue to seek cohesion and stability without closure.
III. CULTURAL COHESION AND STABILITY DESPITE MORE OPEN BORDERS
This Article has thus far undermined two critical assumptions of the
theory that more open national borders will cause sub-national closures
as states and localities seek to preserve the culture and stability of their
communities. Part III turns to the third assumption-namely, that
closure is the only method by which sub-national entities can attempt to
protect their cohesiveness and stability when confronted with increased
due process rationales for its decision, the Hazelton court relied on preemption principles instead, ruling
that the Hazelton ordinance was unlawful, not because it might have been a proxy for race, led to racial
profiling, or purported to deny shelter to human beings, but rather because it affected immigration. See
496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
184. See infra Part I1B.
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undocumented migration. This section first argues that exclusion and
closure at the sub-national level is not an inevitable response to
increased immigration. Sub-national reaction has been bi-directional,
with some localities producing decidedly anti-immigrant responses, and
others extending membership benefits to undocumented residents.
Second, subpart III.B maintains that communities can promote cultural
cohesion and stability without closure. Those communities highly
valuing their particular, temporally-specific cultural status quo, however,
can incur significant economic, spatial, and social costs. Finally, subpart
III.C sets forth a vision of cultural cohesion that can include both current
and future members of our national and sub-national communities,
regardless of national citizenship status.
A. Bi-directional Sub-national Legislative Responses
As an empirical matter, the inevitable causal connection between
national openness and sub-national closure posited by legal and political
theorists is overstated. Over the past few decades, and especially in
recent years, as some states and localities have sought to deter
undocumented immigrants from entering or remaining within their
jurisdictions, others have chosen to ignore and tolerate their presence,
while still others have opted to include undocumented residents in their
communities. In response to the current federal border policy and lack of
congressional action, this last group of localities has found it more
desirable to open their gates and include undocumented persons than to
find ways to exclude them. Their response belies the contention that
increased immigration and a perceived lack of national border
enforcement automatically triggers sub-national closures. In addition,
their reactions showcase that sub-federal political stability and cohesive
communities do not require exclusionary laws intended to deter non-
members of the national political community.
During the same time period that a number of cities such as Hazelton,
Pennsylvania sought to expel unwanted immigrants through rental and
employment regulations, cities such as San Francisco and New Haven
proactively facilitated life for all residents regardless of citizenship
status. 185 Hazelton's overturned ordinance denied residency and
employment to individuals within its borders,' 86 purporting to deprive
persons of fundamental human necessities. In contrast, the San
Francisco and New Haven communities' provision of identity cards to
185. S.F. CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 95.2 (2008) (authorizing the issuance of municipal ID cards); see
sources cited supra note 10.
186. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521-29 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
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undocumented migrants provided them the dignity of recognized
inclusion, along with other tangible benefits.'
87
Other examples of this bipolarity amongst sub-national entities
abound. While many localities have opted-in to the federal immigration
enforcement scheme by volunteering their local police force, 188 dozens
of cities have enacted sanctuary statutes, signifying that they will not
allow local law enforcement personnel to complement federal efforts.
189
Similarly, some states have expressly denied state-college admission to
undocumented persons. Ten states, including three of the largest
immigrant-receiving states-California, New York, and Texas-allow
undocumented persons to attend state universities and receive the same
tuition break for which documented in-state residents are eligible.'
90
Some of these statutes have been upheld against preemption challenges
by opponents.' 91
This bi-directionality adheres even with contested state and local
expenditures on public assistance. Post-PRA and TANF, states
substantially control the spending of the welfare funds, may supplement
federal funds with state monies, and are free to make other critical
allocation decisions, such as further devolving power to localities or
limiting allocation only to U.S. citizens. Seemingly, permitting sub-
national entities the latitude to reduce their public assistance
expenditures, especially by discriminating against a group that cannot
vote in the political process, would lead to welfare denial in almost all
jurisdictions.1 92 Although such a reaction remains a possibility, as an
empirical matter, we have yet to witness this race to the bottom.'
93
Moreover, difference in welfare assistance is not a significant incentive
187. Within the city, identity cards could be used to open bank accounts, and access city services
such as libraries. Undoubtedly, identity cards have drawbacks as well. Undocumented persons would be
identifying themselves to city officials, and potentially leaving themselves open to discovery of their
information through federal subpoena.
188. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); see also Kris W.
Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier. The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005).
189. Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a "Sanctuary"?, 61 SMU L. REv. 133 (2008) (analyzing
development and use of the word "sanctuary" to describe public and private responses in localities to the
presence of undocumented persons); see also Sanctuary Cities and States, Illegal Immigrant Information
Resource, http://sanctuarycities.info/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (providing information
regarding sanctuary policies).
190. See Miguel Bustillo, Texas May Pull Up the Welcome Mat, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007, Al.
191. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. CV 05-2064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 6,
2006) (denying a preemption challenge to CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (2002)). But see Martinez v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
192. Wishnie, supra note 179, at 496.
193. Schuck, supra note 20, at 58.
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for migration across state lines.194 In other words, taking advantage of
the discretion provided by PRA to disqualify non-citizens will not
substantially decrease the rate of immigrants, both documented and
undocumented, attempting to enter and reside in a sub-national
jurisdiction.
These diametric outcomes at the sub-national level provide some
indication of how localities actually respond to borders that are not
absolutely controlled. This does not suggest that the border is currently
"open."' 195 Rather, the disparate local responses to current levels of
documented and undocumented immigration which stand at near record
levels and public perception of current policy as "broken,"' 96 do not
produce uniform sub-national reactions in the name of cultural and
economic preservation. Specifically, with current levels of migration-
including the average 1.8 million estimated documented and
undocumented immigrants entering the nation annually-sub-national
entities do not uniformly build legal walls to enclose themselves and
exclude putative members. Some welcome these new members
regardless of their status vis-A-vis the national political community.
They do so for a number of reasons, including economic necessity,
recognition of community ties developed by migrants, facilitation of
local law enforcement, and satisfaction of human and civil rights.
Importantly, these disparate reactions do not disprove the theory that
local communities will value and pursue cultural cohesion. They do,
however, cast doubt on the corollary that sub-national jurisdictions will
do so through closure. After all, as Christian Joppke notes in his
assessment of British integration policy, "[Britain] perceives the need to
make immigrants and ethnic minorities part of this society and not any
society."' 197 In other words, communities seek to be culturally attractive
to new members who want to specifically enter that particular
community. Those jurisdictions welcoming undocumented migrants are
no different; they desire to be culturally cohesive and distinct, but do not
194. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505-07 (1999); Sykes, supra note 28, at 159 (noting that
undocumented persons participate only minimally in entitlement programs).
195. Currently, the U.S. is experiencing its second largest wave of immigration in its history, with
the foreign bom population in 2006 accounting for 12.57% of total population. The highest point was in
1910 when it stood at 14.7%. See PEW HISPANIC CTR., STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION 1N THE UNITED STATES, 2007 (2009), http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/factsheet.php?Facts
heetlD=45; U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/ (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008); see also Jacoby, supra note 23, at 50-58.
196. Rep. Tom Tancredo, Broken Border Promises, WASH. TIMES, May 16, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/may/I 6/20070516-083512-3445r/.
197. Christian Joppke, Immigration, Citizenship, and the Need for Integration 12 (U. Penn.
Conference on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism, 2008), available at http://www.sas.upen
n.edu/dcc/documents/ImmigrationCitizenshipandtheNeedforlntegration.doc.
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understand the inclusion of undocumented persons as antithetical to that
goal.
These sub-national communities that either tolerate or ignore the
presence of undocumented persons, or open their doors to them,
undermine the contention that strict closure must occur at the national
level to prevent sub-national closure. Fundamentally, then, the drive to
distinguish one's own political community and remain cohesive occurs
regardless of the relative openness of the national border. Indeed, for a
city like New Haven, the idea of remaining welcoming to undocumented
migrants could constitute part of its distinctiveness. When San Francisco
provides identity cards for migrants and declares itself a sanctuary city,
its municipal government and its voting community are not striving for
disunity and destruction of its political order. That is, responding to
undocumented migration by including new members and residents has
done nothing to render San Francisco's culture any less cohesiveness or
less stable.1 98 Neither does it signify that San Francisco's political
community has abandoned its drive for a particularly attractive cultural
affect. Inclusiveness, as well as exclusiveness, can serve that goal.
Cities that do not erect legal barriers to the entry of undocumented
persons recognize that their local culture will change. But, the change
caused by undocumented migrants is only one part of the cultural
evolution that is taking place already within the locality. Those
dissatisfied with this alteration, however, may leave the community if
the rate of change exceeds their tolerance level. 199 Although many
localities have not sought closure as a response to failed efforts at
comprehensive national legislation and tighter border control, others
may attempt to preserve some measure of their current cultural status
quo through self-segregation and disaggregation from their incumbent
geographic space.
B. Voluntary Self-Segregation and the Cost of Cultural Status Quo
Despite the opportunity to maintain cultural cohesion and political
stability through inclusion, some communities may still desire to
minimize the rate of immigrant-induced cultural change. A sub-national
community can minimize the rate of change to its current cultural traits,
but can do so only if it values those traits more than the monetary and
spatial costs of preserving them entails. In the strictest sense, a
198. San Francisco has used other legislative efforts to differentiate itself from other localities and
instill pride and cohesiveness in its polity. Both the past performance of gay marriages in San Francisco,
and its current stance on the issue have set it apart from many other localities.
199. Chang, supra note 64, at 109-13.
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community can hope to minimize all incursions into its way of life by
abandoning its ambition to remain a political community tied to a
specific geographic locale, and choosing instead to remain as a cultural
community that does not lay claim to a particular space and its attendant
institutions. This Article contends that voluntary self-segregation and its
related costs are the sole manner by which sub-national communities
within the U.S. can insulate themselves from cultural change produced
by immigration. Given the limitations on sub-national exclusion,
keeping a cultural community tied to a particular geographic space and
its attendant political institutions will increase cultural rate change as
immigrants, both documented and undocumented, become neighbors
and economic participants alongside incumbents.
Given free choice and movement, individuals will presumably place
themselves in the communities which best fit their lifestyle and cultural
preferences. 200 Relying partially on Charles Tiebout's model of localities
and incentives, Professor Howard Chang argues that free movement
serves distinctiveness more than enclosure and restriction at sub-national
levels.20' Movement allows unhindered choices for individuals to move
to where the culture best fits them, and allows communities to identify
themselves as promoting a particular cultural vision, subject to the
limitation on racial, religious, and other impermissible definitions. In
some sense, this phenomenon already occurs in the U.S., with most
major metropolitan communities housing ethnic and religious
enclaves. 20 2 The critical aspect of these distinctive enclaves is that they
are voluntary, and have no claim to excluding others who do not fit into
the community's self-professed identity. They allow individuals to
choose whether the benefits attendant to residing or working in that
community outweigh the costs and detriments of being the cultural
203
minority.
Here, it is useful to distinguish between a cultural community and a
political community. A cultural community-for example, a religion, or
a particular tribe-maintains an associational right to define its
parameters and exclude outsiders who do not meet those criteria. 0 4
Thus, as a non-Mormon, I have no claim to be recognized as a Mormon
by other Mormons unless I satisfactorily meet the requirements to enter
200. Id at 99-104 (citing Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956)).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 102; see also Ford, supra note 28, at 216-18.
203. Chang, supra note 64, at 109-13.
204. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (ruling that an organization has a First
Amendment right of association to deny membership to an individual who undermines the
organization's viewpoint).
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their community. But, Mormonism exists in the ether; that is, in the U.S.
it cannot lay exclusive claim to a political community and governing
institutions tied to an expansive, resource-filled geographic space from
which outsiders are excluded. In this sense, Mormons have embedded
their cultural community inside a larger political community. Thus, we
can distinguish the purely cultural community from the political
community which seeks to use culture as the barbed wire to keep
migrants distant from a resource-filled, labor-hungry, economic
opportunity-laden geographic space. A community preoccupied with its
specific and current brand of culture may either be concerned with its
membership or concerned with its territorial reach. It has no entitlement
to lay claim to both simultaneously. More accurately, a community may
not lay claim to both through the machinery of the state.20 5 The Supreme
Court opinion in Boy Scouts v. Dale,20 6 allowing the Boy Scouts of
America to dismiss a gay scoutmaster, for example, only places the
government's imprimatur on cultural protection for the non-territorial
membership community.
20 7
In comparison, religio-cultural communities such as the Amish are
able to preserve significant parts of their traditional way of life by
regulating membership, but they also voluntarily residentially segregate
themselves in remote areas, far from economic centers and national and
sub-national political institutions.20 8 They do not attempt to participate
economically with the general populace, except in limited ways.
20 9
Groups such as the Mormons or ethnic enclaves within large
metropolitan areas, in contrast, can choose not to recognize fellow
205. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (ruling that a
N.Y. statute creating a school district with its borders contiguous with the village of Kiryas Joel, an
enclave for a particular Jewish sect, violated the Establishment Clause because it intended to allow a
religious community to exclude outsiders access to public institutions).
206. Dale, 530 U.S. at 640; see also Sunder, supra note 54, at 524.
207. Dale, 530 U.S. at 640.
208. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 68 (1997) (referring to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Wisconsin v. Yoder which allowed the Amish to forego mandated public school beyond a certain grade,
stating "[t]he arrangement is justified in part by the marginality of the Amish, and in part by their
embrace of marginality: their deep commitment not to live anywhere except on the margins of American
society and not to seek any influence beyond them").
209. See, e.g., DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 254 (1989) ("Few
outsiders have chosen to place aside technological convenience and the delights of individualism and
submit themselves to the collective order of Amish life. There is a price to being Amish-a price that
few outsiders have been willing to pay. It means giving up self-assertive individualism-submitting to
the Ordnung, to religious tradition, to the voice of elders, and to communal wisdom. It means foregoing
individual preference in many areas--dress, marriage, transportation, education. It means limited
mobility, limited occupational choice, and limited possibilities for self-enhancement. It means foregoing
many conveniences, restricting social friendships, avoiding many types of leisure, and turning off
electronic media. It means, in short, inhabiting a different social world, where the group, rather than the
individual, reigns supreme.").
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residents as part of their religious or ethnic institutions, but cannot
enforce residential separation of those individuals deemed not to be
cultural members. Thus, because Mormons have chosen not to
geographically segregate themselves and have chosen to participate in
governing political and economic structures, they have no claim to
exclusion of outsiders to reduce their rate of cultural change.
In this way, the cost of maintaining the cultural status quo acts as the
sorting mechanism, able to smoke-out animus-based motives for
exclusion of non-incumbent residents. Minimizing the rate of cultural
change exacts economic and spatial costs.210 The Amish subsist in
relatively small communities with limited employment opportunities. As
Walzer himself notes, Australia's "White Australia" policy could only
have persevered in a "Little Australia." 211 That is, communities can
sacrifice participation in the national and global economy, and can cede
territory to retard the change of their specific cultural status quo, but
cannot do so by excluding migrants within the national borders.
Importantly, however, even self-segregation cannot preserve the cultural
status quo unchanged. As isolated and distinct as the Amish have been,
the past several decades have witnessed changes in their cultural
practices to account for the reality of technological and communicatory
advances in the world around them.
212
Moreover, even without legal wall-building or self-segregation,
groups within the national border have successfully separated
themselves ethnically, economically, and ideologically.213 They do not
restrict residential membership, but outsiders unable to partake of the
cultural exchanges between members of that community may not desire
to join. Applying this model to the localities choosing to exclude
undocumented persons teases out the underlying problem that those
local community members may be experiencing; their culture may have
morphed to one whose most outstanding characteristics are universally
shared impulses to achieve greater economic prosperity and live
peaceftIlly.
214
210. Id. Communities can choose not to incur these costs, but then their ability to minimize
cultural change is left to chance.
211. WALZER, supra note 22, at 47; see also John Thompson, White Australia Has a Black
History: Sources for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies in the National Library ofAustralia
(James Cook Univ. of North Queensland Indigenous Research Ethics Conference Paper, 1995),
available at http://www.nla.gov.au/nla/staffpaper/thomp.html.
212. KRAYBILL, supra note 209, at 42-43.
213. BISHOP, supra note 170, at 216-17; Chang, supra note 64, at 101-02; Ford, supra note 28, at
216-18.
214. Joppke, supra note 197, at 3 ("I argue that citizenship and integration campaigns are caught
in the paradox of universalism: they aim at integrating immigrants into a particular society that is
different here from there, but they can do so only in a universalistic diction that dodges the particularism
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Faced with the problem of universalism, with 12% of the population
foreign-born and 3% undocumented, and disproportionately high
concentrations of both groups in specific metropolitan areas, incumbent
citizens desirous of avoiding immigrant influences have multiple
jurisdictions to which they can relocate to minimize immigrant-
influenced cultural change rates. But, if those incumbent citizens
otherwise value the financial and other social benefits of their current
location, they will have to endure the cost of a cultural rate of change
affected by the migrants with whom they share their social, economic,
and political institutions. Especially when confronted with the modesty
of the attainable goal-marginal reductions in the rate of cultural
change-many incumbent residents may find their pursuit of a particular
brand of culture an inefficient pursuit.
For those in the cultural majority who remain while their locality
begins to include individuals who are not part of the cultural majority,
their only entitlement to use governmental institutions and legal
mechanisms to stop migrant inflows is triggered when the volume of
immigration threatens the well-being of political institutions. 215 At
minimum, our constitutional order protects the very institutions and
democratic system it enlivens. As Perry explains, however, that point
differs for each community, and will be determined by a combination of
factors such as relative prosperity, current cultural makeup, population
density, and prevailing social and political attitudes. 216 By this measure,
the U.S. must allow more liberal immigration at its national border, and
by extension, localities must be prepared for greater rates of cultural
change.217 The U.S. remains the largest national economy in the
world,218 with some of its component states also taking top spots in the
global economic order. 219 More importantly, on a relative scale, the
U.S.-Mexico border remains the highest wealth differential between two
states with a contiguous national border. 220 The osmotic pressure to
cross the U.S. border, through documented or undocumented means, is
so intense that even knowing the chances of death and the probability of
that they aim at.").
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. Perry, supra note 22, at 115.
217. Id. at 104 ("Once a society has completely met these obligations-and I emphasize that no
Western state currently appears to have done so-there is, I wish to suggest, a discretion concerning
whether to take in more immigrants.").
218. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter World Factbook].
219. Legislative Analyst's Office, California Economy and Budget in Perspective, available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2004/cal_facts/2004_calfacts_econ.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
220. Kennedy, supra note 64.
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family separation, migration remains inevitable. 221 Concurrently, U.S.
population density is relatively low when compared to wealthy and
bordering countries, with approximately half the density of Mexico and
less than one-tenth the density of India and China.2 22 At the local level,
even the most densely populated jurisdictions leave room for new
members. Notably, many of the issues caused by high population
densities are not cultural per se, but are more elemental. Water supplies
and air pollution become issues well before political institutions are
unable to effectively negotiate the varied cultural differences within
local jurisdictions. 223
When migration meets Professor Perry's multi-factored standard or
reaches Professor Chang's hypothesized equilibrium of free labor
movement, nations then possess constrained discretion to exclude
outsiders.224 And, at the hypothetical moment when national border
policy reflects global realities of free goods, capital, and service
movement, and any excess migration would de-stabilize political
institutions and the constitutional order, sub-national entities could
theoretically also be justified in prohibiting entry into their jurisdictions.
Alternatively, if the national community values current levels of
immigration and its cultural status quo, it could "pay," in the form of
foreign aid, to improve the economic conditions in other nations, thereby
dis-incentivizing emigration rates.
225
Until such time when immigration accelerates cultural rate of change
to the point when governing institutions cannot mediate and coerce
disparate groups, voluntary self-sorting remains available as a tool to
minimize cultural rate change. Engaging in self-segregation, however,
may incur significant costs for those who choose to separate in pursuit of
a particular cultural iteration. Because incumbent groups have no
entitlement to sole possession and governance of a specific territory on
which to experience their cultural bond, groups must choose between
sharing space in the hopes of maintaining cultural enclaves without
coercion, or transplanting themselves from incumbent locales to more
remote areas where they can shield themselves from immigrant-induced
cultural change. Neither option, however, requires closure and exclusion
through public policy.
221. See supra notes 5, 63 and accompanying text.
222. See World Factbook, supra note 218.
223. Alden Speare, Jr. & Michael J. White, Optimal City Size and Population Density for the 21st
Century (NPG Forum Series, 1990), available at www.npg.org/forum_series/optimalcity_size.htm.
Undoubtedly, cultural issues intertwine with environmental ones. It is likely easier to mobilize a more
homogeneous population to change behaviors than a culturally disparate one. Id.
224. See Chang, supra note 64, at 127; Perry, supra note 22, at 114-15.
225. Perry, supra note 22, at 103; see also Shachar, supra note 48.
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C. Shared Political Culture and Common Futures
Although, as this Article maintains, local regulatory attempts at
cultural preservation in response to liberal national immigration policies
are practically, constitutionally, and economically dubious, national and
sub-national communities can still pursue a particular and cohesive
American culture and vision. Some sub-national jurisdictions have not
responded to current immigration volume and undocumented presence
by erecting legal walls. Instead, they have chosen to maintain their
cultural bond either despite inclusion, or by inclusion. This section
argues that political communities, bereft of their ability to freeze and
cryogenically preserve a particular and distinctive cultural manifestation,
can still remain bonded enough to ensure political stability. Moreover,
national and sub-national communities can foster a joint culture for
incumbents and newcomers focused on political institutions and
participation, the Constitution, and the common future for all
inhabitants. In this way, communities will retain the external benefit that
homogenous culture affords-stability in the political, social, and
economic institutions that protect individuals' health, safety, and
welfare-without having to exclude on constitutionally or economically
unviable grounds.
So far, this Article has argued that political communities attempting
to preserve their cultural character will only be able to influence the rate
at which their culture changes. If majorities in those localities want to
limit the ways in which immigrants change their culture, their options
are constitutionally proscribed. Other than accepting the inevitability of
cultural evolution, the other possibility is for like-minded, culturally
homogenous groups to self-segregate and spatially distance themselves
from economic centers where migrants may seek residency. It is of
course possible that spatial separation and geographic options may be
limited, or that the cost of such relocation is prohibitive when compared
to the benefits of controlling cultural rate change. Under these
circumstances, cultural and political majorities must negotiate the
presence of cultural minorities on the same territory by focusing on the
shared future that both cultural majorities and minorities will experience.
In part, this version of shared culture that focuses on the future
requires a drastic shift in our polity's current definition of culture, and
our courts' legal response to that shift.226 Incumbent members of both
national and sub-national American communities must recognize that
their culture-indeed any culture-is not a static thing reducible to
226. Sunder, supra note 54, at 560.
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simple identity markers. Rather, culture is created through interaction
among multiple community members, in constant flux, mediating
dissent, and experimenting with new possibilities. 227 As Professor
Sunder explains, "[w]e are moving away from imposed cultural
identities toward a conception of cultural identity based on autonomy,
choice, and reason." 228 Starting from this descriptively useful and
normatively preferable understanding, communities members will
facilitate their process of focusing on shared futures without the
constraints of past, static cultural identities. According to Seyla
Benhabib, "[t]he continuing identity of a society and culture is based
upon its capacity to deal with outside challenges and contingencies
while also retaining the belief of its members in its normative systems
and value structures."
229
The arena for reaffirming faith in normative systems and value
structures are the institutions of everyday life. When outright exclusion
through denial of residency, healthcare, and racial or religious profiling
is not an option, both migrants and incumbents must negotiate the same
terrain, both physically and politically. 230 On this shared terrain, both
incumbents and migrants will interact in economic, social, educational,
religious, and political spheres. Of those, our constitutional order
mandates individuals comply with the coercive control of political
institutions. Even if non-citizens do not vote in local governments, they
do actively participate in other community structures such as parents
associations at schools and as leaders in religious organizations.231 In
addition, statutes in all fifty states require some amount of schooling,
which will by and large takes place in public institutions. Because the
children of immigrants, including the children of undocumented
migrants, have a right to publicly funded education on equal terms with
children of citizens, 232 both incumbents and immigrants have a real stake
in educational systems and funding decisions. Local governance
structures and educational institutions, therefore, mediate interactions
227. Id.
228. Id. at518.
229. Id. at 523 (quoting Seyla Benhabib, Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the
Global Dialogical Community, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN
CAPABILITIES 240 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995)).
230. Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, supra note 125, at 46 ("[L]ocal players
and backdrops like those involved in recent immigration controversies like. . .Hazelton are not, as some
have suggested, a new setting for today's border wars. Rather, they are in some sense, the only scale on
which border wars can truly take place.").
231. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397-1417 (1993).
232. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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between different groups, including both cultural majorities and
minorities. 233
While allowing disparate cultural groups to voluntarily sort
themselves into enclaves if they wish, concentrating efforts on our joint
political culture and neighborhood institutions will provide sufficient
mutual ground to capture many of the benefits of cultural homogeneity.
In a democracy that values autonomy of belief and expression as
enshrined in the First Amendment, mandating belief and participation in
governance structures and governing documents is a significant and
reasonable coercive expectation of national and sub-national political
communities. Although focus on a common political culture is, in
Kwame Anthony Appiah's formulation, "pretty thin gruel, ' 234 it is the
appropriate consistency for a nation that does not define itself ethnically
or religiously, and forbids its sub-national units from using state
machinery to accomplish the same. 235 As the noted theorist Jurgen
Habermas explains, in a liberal democracy, the social glue necessary for
well-functioning communities should be juridical and political, not
cultural, geographical, or historical.236 Put another way, "thick" notions
of culture should be anathema to American communities, both national
and sub-national.237
This Article posits another formulation, adding a dash of thickness to
the thin gruel of common belief in a set of political procedures and
ideals. Participation, and not just belief, in the communal institutions
responsible for all individuals regardless of citizenship status is the
critical component. Collective interaction in these local and community
institutions is necessary because it helps cement a common identity and
culture that is more tangible and experiential than asking individuals to
believe in the abstractions of constitutional patriotism. The shared
commitment to a procedural framework, for equality and pluralism
233. Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding
that Hialeah's ordinance prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice was violative of the Free Exercise clause
because it targeted a specific religious minority).
234. Appiah, supra note 111, at 630. But see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (suggesting that procedural liberalism insufficient for
social unity).
235. But see Angel R. Oquendo, National Culture in Post-National Societies, 50 VILL. L. REV.
963, 975 (2005) ("It is also difficult to achieve social integration solely on the basis of a political culture.
Solidarity usually requires more than a common set of political principles.").
236. Joppke, supra note 197, at 6 (quoting JuRGEN HABERMAS, EINE ART
SCHADENSABWICKLUNG (1987)).
237. Cf Oquendo, supra note 235, at 967-68 ("When the state posits a particular 'thick' national
culture for the entire country, it usually focuses on a particular (almost invariably majority) segment of
the society. Even if the state tries to be as inclusive as possible, it typically excludes certain elements in
order to give some coherence to the concept of a national culture.").
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provides a solid foundation for community cohesiveness, but what will
keep individuals bonded over time are the substantive outcomes of
interactions, compromises, and understandings which they will
experience while negotiating in shared institutions like mosques,
schools, and recreation centers. It is also in these institutions where
communities will experience the "cultural dissent" that will inevitably
modify and evolve their local cultures.
Past attempts to map this unity onto the status of nation-state
"citizenship" break down in globalized systems of free movement of
goods, services, capital, and labor.238 While there is no mistaking the
importance of U.S. citizenship for the rights, benefits, and life
opportunities it affords, 239 the nation-state is no longer necessarily the
sole source of rights, protection, and belonging for individuals within
it. 240 It is for this reason that outsiders from the perspective of national
immigration policy are nevertheless treated as insiders and members by
residents of sub-national communities who have developed strong ties
and negotiated economic, social, educational, and governing institutions
with non-citizens. 241 Objecting to the federal fence-building project,
towns along the U.S.-Mexico border openly mock the need to build
walls to separate border communities. 242 To many, the evolving and
intertwined cultures and economies of the border towns, rich with
migrants, is more immediate and necessary than national delineations of
who should be considered a member and who should not.
This is not to discount the importance of the national unit.243 The
national political community, to the extent nation-states remain
entrenched in the international order,244 helps enlarge the common
economic market and provide for security. Assuming that a truly
globalized economic market is unattainable so long as nation-states
remain committed to immigration regulation which distorts labor
movement,245 the localized ideas of economic success must give way to
238. Sassen, supra note 168, at 57-58.
239. Shachar, supra note 48, at 379.
240. BOSNIAK, supra note 30.
241. Raskin, supra note 231, at 1397-1417 (noting non-citizen activity on school boards and local
government).
242. See sources cited supra notes 2-3.
243. See Shachar, supra note 48, at 379 (noting that the arbitrariness of birth on one side of a
national border will significantly determine prospects for economic and educational opportunities).
244. Stephen H. Legomsky, Comment, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (1994)
(considering reasons why citizenship in nation-states may be important and arguing that the current
international orderjustifies the use of citizenship).
245. Chang, supra note 64, at 93-97.
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national considerations of free movement.246 Similarly, national political
communities should remain vigilant about security threats to the
populace, and highly regulate entry of those that would undermine or
oppose the constitutional structure and political institutions of national
and sub-national communities. 247 Here, the requirement of shared faith
and participation in governing institutions has bite. One cannot and
should not be given entry to national or sub-national jurisdictions if
one's goal is to destabilize those institutions; 248 that individual would
not share a belief in the communal political culture for jointly shaping
the shared future of individuals from disparate ethnic, religious, and
linguistic backgrounds.
CONCLUSION
Currently, the federal polity and several states and localities are
construction zones. As the national political community builds a fence at
a portion of its south-western border, sub-national political communities
are busy erecting legal walls meant to exclude and deter immigrants,
especially undocumented ones. Yet, these barriers cannot accomplish
what they purport to achieve-faithfully preserving the cultural status
quo. While cultural connectedness increases community cohesiveness
and helps ensure long-term stability, jurisdictions that have chosen not
to build walls, or have chosen to construct welcoming bridges,
demonstrate that inclusion can also facilitate cohesive and stable
communities. By accepting new members and including them in the
shared project of developing a joint future within local and national
political units, both national and sub-national communities can better
serve the needs of a globalized future, economic welfare, and national
security. Undermining one of the justifications for strict national border
control and enforcement, this Article ultimately proffers that cultural
preservation, and protection of that culture from immigrant influence, is
not a worthwhile or legitimate aim of public policy. While individuals
and groups are free to attempt to maintain their cultural traits through
voluntary isolation, an evolving and distinct political culture that can
246. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999). The trade jealousies between states were one of the motivating reasons for abandoning the
Articles of Confederation in favor of the Constitution. L. BRADFORD PRINCE, THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION VS. THE CONSTITUTION 10-12 (Harvard Univ. Press 1867).
247. See Johnson, Protecting National Security Through More Liberal Admission of Immigrants,
supra note 23.
248. Perry, supra note 22, at 114.
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include both incumbents and immigrants is the key to a prosperous and
common future.
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